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CONSTRUCTING A NEW ACTION FOR
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF ECONOMIC
LOSS: BUILDING ON CARDOZO AND
COASE
Michael D. Lieder*
Abstrac" This Article proposes the creation of a new tort of negligent infliction of eco-
nomic loss, a hybrid of negligence, negligent representation, and breach of contract. An
action in this new tort would permit an injured party to recover for economic loss caused
by a person with whom the party is not in contractual privity. This Article focuses on the
infliction of economic loss by negligent construction, where courts have applied various
doctrines and arrived at six distinct and inconsistent approaches to liability issues.
This Article provides a solution applicable to litigation for negligent construction. Any
action should protect an injured party's reliance rather than expectation interests consis-
tent with the economic risks and benefits associated with such an action. This Article
structures in Restatement-like format a new action to protect the injured party's reliance
on the tortfeasor, without exposing the tortfeasor to unacceptable risks. Finally, this Arti-
cle suggests how to recast the elements of the proposed tort into more general terms for
application to any dispute involving the negligent infliction of economic loss.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past thirty years, courts and commentators have repeat-
edly addressed whether an architect, contractor or developer should
be liable for a plaintiff's economic loss1 arising from a defect or delay
1. The term "economic loss" generally connotes all losses except those from personal injury
or damage to property other than the allegedly defective property. Economic loss includes
diminution in the value of the allegedly defective property, the costs of repair and replacement,
loss of use, and consequent loss of profits and goodwill. Barrett, Recovery of Economic Loss in
Tort for Construction Defects: A Critical Analysis, 40 S.C.L. REV. 891, 892 n.1 (1989).
The boundary between damage to the defective property and damage to other property is often
problematic. If a defect in the pipes installed in a house at the time of the initial construction
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in the construction of an improvement, when the parties are not in
privity of contract and the plaintiff has suffered no injury to person or
property other than the allegedly defective improvement.2 They have
arrived at a bewildering array of solutions,3 none of which is
satisfactory.
This issue generally arises in two settings. First, a contractor or
other party involved in the construction of an improvement sues
another builder,4 most often the architect or supervising engineer, for
economic loss arising during the construction project. Second, after
the completion of construction, an owner or tenant, or occasionally a
party with no direct interest in the property, sues one of the builders.
In either setting, the plaintiff often sues in contract and tort. The
plaintiff alleges that the builder's contractual duties, especially its5
implied warranties, run to the plaintiff despite the absence of privity.
causes injury to the walls of the house, the injury may be classified either as an economic loss
(pipes and walls are part of the same property-the house) or property damage (pipes and walls
are separate). This Article does not address that issue.
2. When a defect in construction results in personal injury or significant damage to property
other than the defective property itself, the injured party may sue for negligence, even if the
alleged tortfeasor and injured party are not in privity of contract. See, eg., Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314, 320-24 (1965) (tenants of original house purchaser may sue
builder for negligence in installing water heating system that produced excessively hot water that
scalded tenants' infant son). If the defect that caused the injury is subject to an express or
implied warranty, the injured party may also sue for breach. See, eg., 207 A.2d at 324-28.
Under either the tort or contract claim, the injured party may recover all consequential economic
loss in addition to the damages directly arising from the personal injury or property damage.
This Article does not address "parasitic" economic loss.
3. Part III of this Article addresses various judicial solutions. Commentators disagree
whether plaintiffs should have relief, and if so, under what theories. See, Barrett, supra note 1, at
932-33 (property owners suffering only economic loss from construction defects should be denied
recovery under a negligence theory; contract law should supply the only remedy); Grubb, A Case
for Recognising Economic Loss in Defective Building Cases, 43 CAMBRIDOGE L.J. 111 (1984)
(property owners suffering only economic loss from construction defects should be permitted to
sue nonprivity builders for negligence); Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The
Examples of J'Aire and of Products Liability, 23 SAN DIEOO L. REv. 37 (1986) (although a
general tort theory concerning the recovery of economic loss may be impossible, contract law,
not tort law, should have governed the claim of a commercial tenant against a general contractor
hired by the property owner to renovate the tenant's space); Wright & Nicholas, The Collision of
Tort and Contract in the Construction Industry, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 457 (1987) (a builder, such
as a contractor, subcontractor or architect, should not have a negligence claim against another
builder when the claimant suffered only economic loss; contract law should supply the only
remedy); Note, Architectural Malpractice. A Contract-Based Approach, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1075
(1979) (although tort suits against nonprivity builders should be permitted, contract duties
should determine the builders' reasonable standard of conduct).
4. This Article refers to architects, contractors, and subcontractors collectively as "builders"
and to a builder who is not in privity of contract with a plaintiff as a "nonprivity builder."
5. For clarity of reference and to avoid using only the masculine gender, this Article refers to
builders with neuter pronouns, original purchasers of an improvement with masculine pronouns,
and subsequent purchasers with feminine pronouns.
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The plaintiff also claims that the builder breached a duty not to act
negligently or engage in negligent misrepresentations so as to cause
economic loss. The builder typically responds that its duty not to
cause economic harm is contractual only and that its contractual duty
does not extend beyond the party with which it contracted. The "eco-
nomic loss" rule, a doctrine which states that negligence law applies
only to injuries to person or property, not to purely pecuniary loss,
precludes a negligence or negligent misrepresentation claim. There-
fore, the builder concludes, it has no duty to the plaintiff.
In some cases, if no claim exists against the nonprivity builder, the
claimant retains a viable claim against the party with whom it con-
tracted.6 In many other cases, however, if the claimant cannot sue the
nonprivity builder, it will have no claim at all, or at least no economi-
cally worthwhile claim. The statute of limitations may have expired
on the contract claim but not the tort claim,7 the claimant may not
have received a warranty broad enough to support a claim,' or the
contracting party may be insolvent.9
According to its proponents, the economic loss rule provides two
primary benefits outweighing its deleterious impact on injured parties:
the prevention of disproportionate liability;1" and the protection of
6. See New Mea Constr. Corp. v. Harper, 203 N.J. Super. 486, 497 A.2d 534, 540 (1985)
("[T]here is no need here to invent an independent tort cause of action against [the individual
owner of the corporate contractor] in order to permit the owners to recover against the
defaulting promisor contractor."). The claimant may nevertheless elect to sue a nonprivity
builder in tort for several reasons: to bring in as many defendants as possible, the hope being that
the claim against one of them will stick or that the number of contributors will lead to a larger
settlement; to recover the greater damages that may be available in tort, including punitive
damages; or to avoid imposing a strain on a continuing relationship with the contracting party.
See Wright & Nicholas, supra note 3, at 457-58; see also Schwartz, supra note 3, at 41.
7. This is especially likely in states that have adopted the discovery rule for tort, but not
contract, claims. Compare Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578, 583
(1983) (discovery rule adopted for all tort actions not governed by legislatively created discovery
rule) with State v. Holland Plastics Co., 111 Wis. 2d 497, 331 N.W.2d 320, 325 (1983) (in
contract actions, statute of limitations begins to run from date of breach, regardless whether the
injured party knows of the breach at that time).
8. See Barrett, supra note 1, at 932-33; infra notes 202-17 and accompanying text (discussing
contract claims by subsequent owners).
9. See Juliano v Gaston, 187 N.J. Super. 491, 496, 455 A.2d 523, 525 (1982), cert. denied, 93
N.J. 318, 460 A.2d 709 (1983); Alvord & Swift v. Stewart M. Muller Constr. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 276,
385 N.E.2d 1238, 1240 (1978).
10. See, e.g., Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, Culinary Workers' Union, Local 226 v.
Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 410, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (1982); General Public Util. v. Glass Kitchens of
Lancaster, 374 Pa. Super. 203, 209, 542 A.2d 567, 570 (1988) (per curiam); Barrett, supra note 1,
at 938-39. See generally Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A
Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1513, 1528 (1985) (the negligent infliction of economic loss
cases are "best understood as a manifestation of concern about widespread tort liability").
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parties' freedom to allocate risks by contract.t I In support of the for-
mer, the more important, courts frequently quote from Justice Car-
dozo's decision in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 2 which denied a
lender's claim that the defendant's accountants had negligently
audited financial statements on which the lender had relied. 3 Justice
Cardozo stated, "[i]f liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or
blunder... may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."' 4
As the use of Justice Cardozo's decision from a nonconstruction
dispute indicates, the issue whether an injured party should recover in
tort for negligently inflicted economic loss arises in many contexts
outside the construction setting. This Article proposes the adoption of
a new tort, a hybrid of negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and
contract actions, dubbed the "negligent infliction of economic loss."
It works effectively in construction-defect cases to provide relief to
injured parties without exposing nonprivity builders to indeterminate
risks. It should logically work just as well in any other circumstance
of negligently inflicted economic loss. Economic loss caused by negli-
gent construction apparently raises similar issues as other types of neg-
ligently inflicted economic loss. 5
The argument is developed in four parts. Part II discusses the
development of the doctrines which courts have applied to the con-
struction cases. These doctrines are sometimes at odds, and unsurpris-
ingly, courts have applied them in many ways. Part III identifies six
distinct, inconsistent approaches adopted by various jurisdictions.
Part IV contains the bulk of the Article. After determining that any
action should protect the injured party's reliance interest,
11. See General Public Util. v. Glass Kitchens of Lancaster, 374 Pa. Super. at 209, 542 A.2d
at 570; Barrett, supra note 1, at 937-38; see infra notes 304-14 and accompanying text.
12. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
13. 174 N.E. at 444-48. Several other Cardozo opinions discussed in this Article also shape
the debate on economic loss claims against nonprivity builders.
14. I. at 444 (emphasis added).
15. The action's application to non-construction disputes is considered only illustratively in
this Article. Several authors have discussed the possibility or desirability of permitting parties to
recover for negligently caused economic loss, without concentrating on issues associated with
defects or delay in the construction of improvements. See, eg., Abel, Should Tort Law Protect
Property Against Accidental Loss?, 23 SAN DEoO L. REv. 79 (1986) (advocating denial of all
recoveries for accidental loss); Dente, Negligence Liability to All Foreseeable Parties for Pure
Economic Harm: The Final Assault upon the Citadel, 21 WAKE FORST L. REv. 587 (1986) (if
trends continue, lack of privity will no longer bar negligence actions for economic loss); Rabin,
supra note 10, at 1534 (primary reason for denial of economic loss has been concern for liability
disproportionate to the egregiousness of the act); Note, Purely Economic Loss: A Standard for
Recovery, 73 IOWA L. Rav. 1181 (1988) (advocating recovery for negligently inficted economic
loss if the plaintiff and harm were foreseeable).
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microeconomic analysis, in particular the Coase theorem, 16 is applied
to show that Cardozo correctly identified indeterminacy as the major
problem posed by an action to recover for negligently inflicted eco-
nomic loss. The proposed action is structured to protect injured par-
ties' reliance on the nonprivity builder without exposing the builder to
claims by an indeterminate class of possible plaintiffs seeking indeter-
minate types and amounts of damages for losses caused over an inde-
terminate period of time. Finally, Part V recasts the tort into more
general terms and illustrates its application to non-construction
disputes.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOVERNING
DOCTRINES
Until the second half of the twentieth century, no jurisdiction would
have recognized a claim against a nonprivity builder to recover purely
economic loss caused by ar alleged delay or defect in the construction
of an improvement. Several different defenses-lack of privity, eco-
nomic loss, caveat emptor, and "completed and accepted"-blocked
recovery.
More recently, however, the privity defense has declined in impor-
tance, and the caveat emptor and "completed and accepted" defenses
have all but disappeared.17 Only the economic loss doctrine remains
vital, having gained strength as a means of preventing the Uniform
Commercial Code from becoming superfluous in products liability liti-
gation.' 8 Meanwhile, the post-1950 expansion of two actions, implied
warranty and negligent misrepresentation, has provided additional
bases for recovery for plaintiffs suffering economic loss from construc-
tion defects. 19
16. The Coase theorem derives from a thirty-year old article, Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcON. 1 (1960), which largely fueled the law and economics movement.
17. See infra notes 20-28 and 42-45 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 29-41 and 65-89 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 47-64 and accompanying text. This Article only briefly discusses these
developments; other authors have addressed them in greater detail. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note
1, at 897-919 (discusses builder's defenses to claim for economic loss caused by defective
construction); Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52
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A. The Builder's Defenses
L Lack of Privity
The privity defense to negligence actions reaches back to 1842. The
English Court of Exchequer held in Winterbottom v. Wright2" that a
mail coach driver had no claim against the defendant, who had con-
tracted with the Postmaster General to maintain the coaches, because
allowing a party not in privity to maintain an action would lead to
"the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no
limit."' 2 1 For the remainder of the nineteenth century, both English
and American courts followed Winterbottom in barring negligence
claims of parties not in privity with the defendant.22
The erosion of the privity defense to negligence actions began with
Justice Cardozo's decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,23 per-
mitting a plaintiff who had suffered personal injury to bring a negli-
gence claim against the manufacturer of a defective car wheel.24 The
privity defense also increasingly proved unavailing when alleged negli-
gence resulted in injury to tangible property.25 By the early 1960s lack
of privity generally did not bar negligence or strict liability actions
arising from personal injuries or damage to tangible property.26
During the last twenty years, most states also have abrogated the
privity defense to claims of negligent construction resulting in purely
20. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
21. Id at 405.
22. See Barrett, supra note 1, at 901-04; Dente, supra note 15, at 587-88; Rabin, supra note
10, at 1529-31. Courts may have misinterpreted the decision. The Winterbottom court may
have intended to condemn a broad third-party beneficiary theory or may have intended to state
"that not every duty assumed by contract will sustain an action sounding in tort." Barrett, supra
note 1, at 901 (quoting Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner
Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 32, 517 A.2d 336, 343 (1986)).
23. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
24. Barrett, supra note 1, at 904-05.
25. The Restatement of Torts did not expressly identify the nature of the interests protected
against unreasonable risk of harm. Its illustrations, however, made clear that harm to the
property of another with whom the actor was not in contractual privity could subject the actor to
liability. See, ag., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 302 illustrations 4, 22, § 303 illustration 2 (1934).
26. The Restatement (Second) of Torts expressly rejects any privity requirement for strict
liability actions. See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964) (a seller of a product is
subject to liability to a user or consumer who suffers personal injury or injury to property even
though the injured party has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller). The Restatement (Second) does not expressly reject the privity defense
for negligence actions. Nevertheless, it continually refers to negligent acts as occurring when the
actor should know that his conduct involves an unreasonable risk of invading another's interest,
without limiting the other to contracting parties, see, eg., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
(1984) §§ 289, 291, and permits consideration in certain circumstances of the unreasonable risk
of harm posed to third parties. Id §§ 294, 295. Clearly, therefore, the Restatement (Second)
does not require contractual privity for a negligence action either.
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economic loss. 2 7 Lack of privity remains, however, a viable defense to
construction defect suits in at least five states.28
2. Economic Loss Doctrine
The extent to which courts prior to 1950 adopted the economic loss
doctrine, preventing plaintiffs from suing under nonintentional tort
theories for injuries causing purely economic loss, is unclear. Some
scholars believed that harm to person or property generally was neces-
sary for a negligence action;29 but in most or all of the cited decisions
denying recovery in negligence when the only harm was pecuniary, the
parties also had not contracted, making it difficult to pinpoint the
determinative factor.30 The Restatement did not address the issue
27. E.g., Bacco Constr. Co. v. American Colloid Co., 148 Mich. App. 397, 384 N.W.2d 427,
433 (1986); Shoffner Indus. v. W.B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 42 N.C. App. 259, 257 S.E.2d 50, 54-55,
cert. denied, 298 N.C. 296, 259 S.E.2d 310 (1979); A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, 62 Wis. 2d
479, 214 N.W.2d 764, 769 (1974).
28. The effect of lack of privity, however, varies slightly among those five jurisdictions. See
Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., 859 F.2d 242, 247 (2d Cir. 1988) (under New York law,
except for accountants, "professionals are not liable either in tort or contract absent privity" for
the plaintiff's purely economic loss); Public Service Enter. Group v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 722
F. Supp. 184, 193-95 (D.N.J. 1989) (under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff may recover because of
negligently caused economic harm only if in contractual privity with the defendant; this case
involves management of a nuclear power plant rather than its construction); Wells v. Clowers
Constr. Co., 476 So. 2d 105, 106 (Ala. 1985) (per curiam) (an action for damages allegedly
arising from the negligent construction of a house, if brought by a party not in privity with the
builder, is barred under the doctrine of caveat emptor); Village of Cross Keys v. United States
Gypsum Co., 315 Md. 741, 556 A.2d 1126, 1131 (1989) (when negligence creates a risk of
economic loss only, an intimate nexus between the parties, such as privity, is required to impose
tort liability); Floor Craft Floor Covering v. Parma Community Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Ohio St.
3d 1, 560 N.E.2d 206, 212 (1990) (in the absence of privity, a contractor has no tort action
against an architect for economic loss caused by the architect's allegedly negligent plans and
specifications).
29. For example, in the first edition of his handbook, Dean Prosser stated:
In other situations, difficult to distinguish in principle, there has been some reluctance to
find such liability to a stranger [to a contract] even for misfeasance-notably in the case of a
building contractor who turns over a defective building to the owner, or one who repairs a
chattel and leaves it in a dangerous condition. The fear of burdening industry with a
crushing responsibility has played a prominent part in these decisions. Particularly where
the harm is to a pecuniary interest of the plaintiff, rather than to his person or tangible
property-as in the case of misrepresentation inducing him to buy-the tendency has been to
restrict liability within very narrow limits.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 207-08 (1941) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted). This is the closest Dean Prosser comes to recognizing the economic loss rule
in the handbook. It is impossible to ascertain from the quotation how much the "tendency" to
restrict liability results from lack of privity and how much from the lack of harm to the plaintiff's
person or tangible property. Moreover, Prosser does not state that no liability exists, only that it
is restricted "within very narrow limits." Id. at 208.
30. See, e.g., Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 47 Ohio L. Abs. 586, 73 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Ohio
App. 1946) ("If one who by his negligence is legally responsible for an explosion or a
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directly, defining a negligent act as one which posed "an unreasonable
risk to another," without specifying the interests imperiled by the
risk.31 The Restatement only implied that purely economic loss was
not recoverable in negligence actions. It did so in several ways: first,
none of its illustrations of negligent acts involved instances of purely
economic lbss;32 second, it contained a separate section for negligent
misrepresentations causing only economic loss,33 which arguably
would have been unnecessary if a plaintiff cbuld recover economic loss
in an ordinary negligence action; and third, it provided an action for
intentional interference with contractual relationships but none for
negligent interference. 4 '
Regardless of the views of scholars and Restatement authors, very
few decisions prior to 1950 stated that injured parties could not
recover in negligence for purely economic loss. In fact, the approaches
taken by many courts suggested that they did not recognize the eco-
nomic loss rule. Their holdings that a plaintiff could not sue in tort for
any type of injury, including purely economic loss, unless in contrac-
tual privity with the defendant, implied that when privity existed, the
plaintiff possessed a negligence claim.35 Moreover, courts sometimes
imposed a tort duty on a defendant who had performed contractual
duties poorly, resulting in only economic loss, stating that the duty
arose at least in part independently of the contract.3 6 Finally, even
conflagration should be required to respond in damages not only to those who have sustained
personal injuries or physical property damage but also to everyone who has suffered an economic
loss .... we might well be appalled by the results that would follow."); United States v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 64 F. Supp. 289, 293 (E.D.N.C. 1946) (despite old common law rules allowing
a master to recover damages for lost services when the defendant negligently injures the master's
servant, the government may not recover for medical care given to a soldier killed by the alleged
negligence of defendant railroad).
31. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 302, 303 (1934).
32. Some involved injury to persons, others injury to property. See, ag., id §§ 302, 303,
illustrations.
33. Ia § 552 (1938). Negligent misrepresentations are discussed in detail below. See infra
notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
34. R=sTATEMENT oF TORTS § 766 (1939). The comment to § 766 is clear: "The essential
thing is the purpose to cause the result. If the actor does not have this purpose, his conduct does
not subject him to liability under this rule even if it has the unintended effect of deterring the
third person from dealing with the other." Id comment d.
35. See, ag., Brunelle v. Nashua Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 95 N.H. 391, 64 A.2d 315 (1949)
(rejects defendant's argument that no tort action is available when parties are in contractual
privity and permits plaintiffs to sue in tort as well as contract when defendant negligently
performed its contractual undertaking to convey good title).
36. Justice Cardozo was among them. In Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275
(1922), which is discussed in greater detail below, see infra text accompanying notes 48-51, he
wrote that public weighers could be liable for negligently failing to weigh beans accurately:
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nominally contractual claims against builders37 actually were based on
the implied duty of the builder to use the skill and care of ordinarily
skilled persons in the business. 38 The courts read this tort duty into
the contracts.39
Although the economic loss rule may not have as clear a heritage as
its advocates believe, it was largely adopted in section 766C of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. That section provides that an actor is
not liable for purely pecuniary harm caused by the actor's negligent
interference with a third party's entry into or performance of a con-
tract with the plaintiff or "with [the plaintiff's] performance of his
contract or making the performance more expensive or
burdensome."'
If followed by the courts, this provision would block all, or virtually
all, claims by one builder against another, because the plaintiff almost
always claims that the defendant's negligence made it more expensive
for the plaintiff to perform its existing contractual duties. Section
766C, however, has had little impact in construction cases.4 1 More-
over, the section does not block a claim by a subsequent purchaser
because the negligent construction generally will not interfere with a
third party's entry into or performance of a contract with the subse-
quent purchaser or make the subsequent purchaser's performance of
an existing contract more expensive.
In such circumstances, assumption of the task of weighing was the assumption of a duty to
weigh carefully for the benefit of all whose conduct was to be governed. We do not need to
state the duty in terms of contract or of privity. Growing out of a contract, it has none the
less an origin not exclusively contractual. Given the contract and the relation, the duty is
imposed by law.
135 N.E. at 276.
37. The builder frequently sued for money withheld by the owner because of an alleged
defect, and the owner asserted the defect as an affirmative contractual defense and/or
counterclaim. See, e.g., Chapel v. Clark, 117 Mich. 638, 76 N.W. 62 (1898); White v. Pallay, 119
Or. 97, 247 P. 316 (1926); Pierson v. Tyndall, 28 S.W. 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
38. See Chapel v. Clark, 76 N.W. at 62; White v. Pallay, 247 P. at 317; Pierson v. Tyndall, 28
S.W. at 232.
39. Cf Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324, 332 (1982) (Ryan, C.J.,
dissenting) (the extension of the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers is a
fiction that actually converts what was originally conceived "as a contract action into an action
in tort in the nature of strict liability").
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1977).
41. Few courts applying the economic loss rule in construction cases have relied on § 766C.
But see Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, Culinary Workers' Union, Local # 226 v. Stern,
98 Nev. 409, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (1982).
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3. Other Doctrines Blocking Recovery
Two other doctrines protected builders: caveat emptor and the
"completed and accepted" defense.42 The doctrine of caveat emptor,
or buyer beware, barred purchasers of new homes from suing sellers
for defects in the property, regardless of whether the defects resulted
in personal injury, damage to other property, or only economic loss.43
The "completed and accepted" defense worked much the same way to
block third party claims: the completion of the work and its accept-
ance by the owner terminated the builder's liability to everyone but
that owner, for personal injury as well as economic loss.' As the
twentieth century progressed, however, "these defenses became rid-
dled with exceptions and have been rejected outright in most
jurisdictions.""5
Through the first half of the twentieth century, therefore, at least
four defenses protected a nonprivity builder against a claim to recover
economic loss caused by an alleged construction defect. As three of
those defenses decreased in importance, the economic loss doctrine
increased, primarily, at first, in products liability litigation. Before dis-
cussing the products liability suits, however, it is necessary to sketch
the development of two actions permitting recovery for purely eco-
nomic loss: negligent misrepresentation and implied warranty.46
42. These doctrines would have had no impact on a lawsuit between two builders on a
project.
43. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults upon the Rule, 14
VAND. L. REv. 541, 542-43 (1961) (through World War II, courts uniformly held that, under
the doctrine of caveat emptor, no warranties of quality or fitness for a known purpose are implied
in the sale of real estate).
44. Barrett, supra note 1, at 904. The concept of contractual privity was crucial to this
defense. The general rule was that:
[Tihe contractor is not liable [for negligence resulting in injury or damage to a third person
after the completion of the work and its acceptance by the owner], on the theory that no
privity of contract exists between the contractor and such third person, and that no duty is
owed by the contractor in performing the contract to one other than the contratee ....
The responsibility for maintaining the completed structure and protecting third persons
against danger therefrom, or for use of it in a defective condition, or for failing to give notice
or warning of danger to be apprehended from its existence, is, after the acceptance, shifted
to the owner.
Annotation, Negligence of Building or Construction Contractor as Ground of Liability upon His
Part for Injury or Damage to Third Person Occurring After Completion and Acceptance of the
Work 13 A.L.R.2d 191, 201-03 (1950).
45. Barrett, supra note 1, at 904-05. But see Wells v. Clowers Constr. Co., 476 So. 2d 105
(Ala. 1985) (per curiam) (caveat emptor bars claims of owners not in privity with the builder-
vendor).
46. These actions were not available in construction cases until the latter half of the twentieth
century. The lack of privity would have blocked a contractor's negligent misrepresentation claim
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B. Actions Available to Plaintiffs
1. Negligent Misrepresentation
The action for negligent misrepresentation developed largely out of
several decisions of the New York Court of Appeals, culminating in
the 1931 decision in Ultramares.47 In deciding against the plaintiffs,
Justice Cardozo distinguished several prior decisions, including his
own opinion in Glanzer v. Shepard.48 In that case, a bean seller
requested defendants, public weighers, to weigh his beans and provide
a copy of the certificate to the plaintiff, the buyer. The weighers' cer-
tificate stated that it was ordered by the seller for the use of the buyer.
The certificate, however, turned out to be incorrect, and the buyer,
relying on it, overpaid.49
Cardozo stated that the transmission of the certificate to Glanzer
"was not merely one possibility among many, but the 'end and aim of
the transaction,' as certain and immediate and deliberately willed as if
a husband were to order a gown to be delivered to his wife. ... "'I
The relationship was akin to contractual privity. The relationship in
Ultramares between the accountants who prepared the audited finan-
cial statements and an unknown lender was different, according to
Cardozo. Whereas in Glanzer, the weigher's service "was primarily
for the information of a third person... and only incidentally for that
of the formal promisee," in Ultramares the accountants' service was
primarily for the audited company "and only incidentally or collater-
ally for the use of those to whom [that company] might exhibit it
thereafter.""1
The Restatement elaborated on the distinction drawn by Cardozo
between the facts in Ultramares and Glanzer. Liability attached to one
who "in the course of his business or profession" negligently supplied
information "for the guidance of others in their business transactions"
if the harm was suffered "by the person or one of the class of persons
for whose guidance the information was supplied" because of "his jus-
tifiable reliance upon it in a transaction in which it was intended to
influence his conduct" or in a "substantially identical" transaction. 2
The Restatement did not expressly provide that liability would extend
against an architect. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text. Nor did courts recognize
implied warranty claims for faulty construction. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
48. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
49. 135 N.E. at 275.
50. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
51. Id. at 446.
52. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 552 (1938).
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to purely economic harm, but illustration 1 makes clear that it
would,5
3
The Restatement (Second) expands the claim marginally54 and,
more important, defines the damages recoverable. The plaintiff may
recover any pecuniary loss suffered in reliance on the misrepresenta-
tions including the difference between the value received and the
purchase price, but not the benefit of the plaintiff's bargain with the
defendant. 55
The plans and specifications prepared by architects and engineers
contain representations relied upon by other builders in the course of
construction. A court following section 552, therefore, may hold an
architect or engineer liable for the economic loss suffered by another
builder in reliance on the plans, despite the application of the eco-
nomic loss rule to negligent performance claims.56
2. Implied Warranty
Claims based on implied warranties date back at least to 1815. 27
The action became sufficiently well established that under the Uniform
Sales Act, adopted in 1906, a seller of goods impliedly warranted that
they were reasonably fit for a particular purpose made known by the
buyer when the buyer relied on the seller's skill or judgment, and a
dealer in goods bought by description warranted their
merchantability.58 Implied warranties have attached to the sale of
goods by merchants ever since.59
53. I, illustration 1. In that illustration, Y Bank makes a loan in reliance on a negligently
prepared audit of A performed by B & Company, a firm of public accountants, which in turn
believed that A would obtain the loan from X Bank instead of Y Bank. Because of the
negligence, Y Bank suffers the loss of the loaned funds. Even though Y Bank has suffered only
economic loss, B & Company may be lialle, depending on whether it undertook the audit on
condition that it be used to obtain the credit from X Bank only. In the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, that illustration reappears in altered form as illustrations 5 through 7 to § 552.
54. Liability extends to one who supplies information in any "transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest," not just in the course of his business or profession. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1976). At least one court has used this provision to hold that a
property owner may be liable to a subcontractor for plans negligently prepared by the owner's
architect. Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Nemours Found., 606 F. Supp. 995, 1001-02 (D. Del. 1985).
Persons under a public duty to give information also may be liable under specified conditions.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(3) (1976).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B (1976).
56. See infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text. The comments to § 766C suggest that
§ 552 should control over § 766C. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C comment e
(1977).
57. See generally 2 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON SALES §§ 15-19, 15-20 (A. Squillante & J.
Fonesca, 4th ed. 1974).
58. UNIF. SALES ACT § 14 (1906) (act superseded by Article 2 of UCC).
59. See B. CLARK & C. SMrrH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES §§ 1.01, 1.02 (1984).
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While merchants impliedly warranted the quality of their goods
throughout the first half of the twentieth century, sellers of newly con-
structed improvements often did not. 6 A builder who contracted
with a consumer to construct a house impliedly warranted its quality,
but caveat emptor protected a builder-vendor who sold a completed
house. Courts reasoned that if the house had not been started prior to
purchase, the buyer could not perform a pre-purchase inspection and
was entitled to protection. If the house had been completed before
purchase, however, the opportunity to inspect obviated the need for an
implied warranty. 61
After the Korean War, several jurisdictions began to eat away at the
distinction, holding that when the plaintiff purchased a house in the
process of construction, the builder-vendor impliedly warranted its
quality. From that point, it was an easy jump to hold that any seller of
a new house gave an implied warranty, whether or not it was
purchased prior to the completion of construction.62 Now all or virtu-
ally all states provide that an implied warranty accompanies the first
sale of a new house.63
This warranty, however, does not help a subsequent purchaser of a
house, or any purchaser of commercial property, unless the warranty
protects more than new home purchasers. To the extent that courts
do extend implied warranties to protect those not in privity with build-
ers, they evade the restrictions of the economic loss rule.6'
C. The Economic Loss Doctrine in the Sale of Products
As privity and other defenses declined, the economic loss doctrine
rose to the fore in the 1960s largely to preserve a role for contractual
60. Professor Roberts ridiculed the distinction, pointing out that the purchaser of a two dollar
fountain pen could recover the cost of the pen from the seller if it did not work, while a couple
who had poured their entire savings into the purchase of a house could not recover from the
developer when the ceiling collapsed. Roberts, supra note 19, at 835-36.
61. Id. at 837-43. Paradoxically, one court recently held that builder-vendors give implied
warranties of habitability, while builders who are not vendors give a lesser warranty. See
Carolina Winds Owners' Ass'n v. Joe Harden Builder, 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897, 899-901
(S.C. Ct. App. 1988), overruled in part, Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335,
384 S.E.2d 730, 736 (1989) (rejects the Court of Appeals' position that a nonvendor builder gives
no warranty, but states in dictum that a builder-vendor gives an implied warranty of habitability
while the nonvendor builder gives only an implied warranty of workmanlike service).
62. Roberts, supra note 19, at 839-41.
63. See Powell & Mallor, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of
Commercial Real Estate, 68 WASH. U.L.Q. 305, 306 (1990); Shedd, The Implied Warranty of
Habitability: New Applications, New Implications, 8 REAL EsT. L.J. 291, 303-06 (1980)
(providing state-by-state list).
64. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (discussing extensions of warranty
protections).
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risk allocations and the Uniform Commercial Code's (UCC) implied
warranty provisions. Under the UCC, a merchant impliedly warrants
the merchantability of the goods it sells,65 and if the seller knows the
particular purpose for which the purchaser intends to use a product,
its fitness for that purpose.66 If the product does not perform up to the
warranty, the seller is liable for direct, incidental and reasonably fore-
seeable consequential damages, regardless of whether the breach
results in personal injury, property damage or only economic loss.67
If an injured purchaser can also sue the seller for negligence, the
implied warranty may still have a unique role, because a plaintiff need
not prove lack of due care to show breach of warranty. 68 The unique-
ness largely disappears, however, if the plaintiff also has a strict liabil-
ity claim under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, because
the basic elements of implied warranty and strict liability actions are
virtually identical.69 Indeed, strict liability doctrine evolved in part to
provide consumers the protection of implied warranties without the
defenses which sometimes defeated implied warranty claims.70
For purposes of this Article, the most important of these defenses
was lack of privity.71 The UCC originally provided that the warranty
ran from the seller of goods to the buyer, members of the buyer's fam-
ily and household and the buyer's guests.72 It took no position
whether a consumer could sue a nonprivity manufacturer for breach of
warranty. 73 As discussed above, by the early 1960s, lack of privity
provided little defense against a negligence claim,74 and the Restate-
65. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1987).
66. Id. § 2-315.
67. See id, §§ 2-714, 2-715. See generally J. WHrrE & R. SummERs, UNEFoRm COMMERCIAL
CODE, ch. 10 (3d ed. 1988).
68. In some cases, proof of inadequate care is difficult. 0. HARum & A. SQUILLANTE,
WARRANrY LAw IN TORT & CONTRACT ACTIONS § 3.2 (1989).
69. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 56-58.
70. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel 50 MniN. L. P1Ev. 791, 799 (1966). Thus, any
plaintiff who can recover for breach of implied warranty also can recover under strict liability,
but not all plaintiffs who can recover in strict liability can also recover for breach of warranty.
71. Two other defenses are the UCC's requirement that the injured party give the seller notice
of and an opportunity to cure the defect, and the UCC's recognition of disclaimers of liability.
Ia at 801; Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel 69 YALE LJ. 1099, 1130-33 (1960). Both of
these issues have arisen in suits by homeowners against builders. See, ag., Kirk v. Ridgway, 373
N.W.2d 491, 497 (Iowa 1985) (upholding trial court decision that one-year delay between
discovery of defect and notice to builder was not unreasonable); Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa. Super. 11,
476 A.2d 427, 432 (1984) (a builder may protect itself from the implied warranty of habitability
by an express disclaimer in the construction contract). The latter of these is discussed briefly
below, see infra text accompanying note 309.
72. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (1962) (amended 1966).
73. See J. WHm & R. SUMMERS, supra note 67, at 457.
74. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
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ment (Second) of Torts expressly provided that an injured consumer
could bring a strict liability claim directly against the manufacturer.75
Many states subsequently also abolished the privity requirement for
implied warranties connected with the sale of goods, refusing to allow
manufacturers to insulate themselves from liability through layers of
distributors and retailers.76 Even with the easing of the privity restric-
tion, however, plaintiffs could not sue more remote parties in contract
than in tort.
Given the similarity between the elements of strict liability and
implied warranty claims and the fewer defenses which a seller could
raise to the former, if all types of injury could be prosecuted in tort,
the UCC's implied warranty provisions and the parties' ability to allo-
cate risks by contract might become no more than an historical arti-
fact. Courts refused to roll back an injured party's right to sue in
negligence and strict liability as well as under the UCC when the
defective product allegedly caused injury to the plaintiff's person or
property; tort law traditionally applied to those types of injury. Many
drew the line, however, when the product caused only economic loss.7 7
Two decisions from 1965 took polar positions. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, in Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc.,78 rejected the
argument that the economic loss rule precluded tort actions. It held
that a consumer could sue a carpet manufacturer in strict liability to
recover the cost of defective carpet.7 9 Four months later, however, the
California Supreme Court, expressly rejecting the reasoning in Santor,
held in Seely v. White Motor Co. 80 that the purchaser of a truck which
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1963).
76. See Coburn v. Lenox Homes, 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599, 601 (1977); Brown v. Fowler,
279 N.W.2d 907, 910 (S.D. 1979); see infra notes 356-61 and accompanying text (discussing
erosion of UCC's privity defense to an implied warranty action).
77. See Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REv. 661, 665-67;
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 51-53.
78. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
79. 207 A.2d at 309. The court explained that making all intermediate sellers parties to a
series of contract claims would be inefficient (this factor has disappeared to the extent that the
vertical privity requirement for breach of warranty suits has been eliminated), that consumers
lack the competence and opportunity to inspect products for defects, that the manufacturer is in
a better position to bear or spread the cost of repair or replacement, and that any distinction
between damage to the product itself and damage to other property is purely arbitrary. Id. at
310-12.
80. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). Since the California Supreme Court's
decision in J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979),
California appellate courts have debated whether that decision silently overruled Seely and
permitted a party suffering only economic loss because of a defective product to bring a
negligence claim against its manufacturer. Compare Ales-Peratis Foods Int'l, Inc. v. American
Can Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 277, 209 Cal. Rptr. 917, 923 (1985) (negligence claim available) with
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overturned due to defective brakes had only a warranty remedy."1
Recovery of the cost of repairs, the purchase price and lost profits in
tort would undermine the risk allocation negotiations of the parties
and/or the scheme of warranty remedies established in the UCC. 2
The courts of several other jurisdictions have staked out intermedi-
ate positions, focusing on the risk of harm. They believe that under
Seely the ability to bring a tort claim depends on a mere fortuity. For
example, if a defective toaster burns, damaging only the toaster, a
plaintiff may sue only in contract; if the fire spreads to the table on
which the toaster rests, a plaintiff may sue in tort. In response, these
courts hold that if the loss takes place in a manner that poses an
unreasonable risk of harm to persons or other property, the plaintiff
may sue in negligence or strict liability, even if the damage happens to
be confined to the defective product itself.8 3
Most jurisdictions have adopted the position staked out in Seely.84
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court strengthened this trend
when it concluded in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc.," an admiralty case, that the economic loss rule pre-
cluded the plaintiff's tort claims for repair costs and lost profits caused
by several allegedly defective turbine engines.8 6 The Court criticized
the intermediate position as "too indeterminate to enable manufactur-
ers easily to structure their business behavior."8 " It then rejected the
Santor approach, at least in the context of two commercial parties, for
several reasons, including the desirability of permitting a manufac-
turer to disclaim warranties or limit remedies in exchange for a reduc-
tion in the purchase price, and in part because of the risk, a la Justice
Cardozo, that a tort duty would expose manufacturers to liability in
Osborne v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 198 Cal. App. 3d 646, 243 Cal. Rptr. 815, 821 (1988)
(negligence and strict liability actions unavailable).
81. 403 P.2d at 149-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-24.
82. See id
83. See eg., Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 329
(Alaska 1981); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1978); Star
Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 29 S.E.2d 854, 858-59 (W. Va. 1982).
84. Even the New Jersey Supreme Court has retreated from its position in Santor, at least in
the context of a commercial purchaser. Spring Motors Distrib. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555,
489 A.2d 660, 672 (1985). When both parties are commercial, the court explained, they have
comparable bargaining power, the purchaser may have even more knowledge of its risk than does
the manufacturer, and allowing a tort suit would undermine the UCC. 489 A.2d at 671.
85. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
86. I at 871. The decision barred the plaintiff in East River from any relief. The applicable
statute of limitations and possibly also a prior settlement agreement barred any contract claim.
rd at 861, 875.
87. I at 870.
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an indefinite amount to an indefinite range of plaintiffs."s Since this
decision, several courts which had not addressed the issue or had fol-
lowed the Santor or intermediate positions have adopted the majority
approach. 9
Many of the same issues recur in suits against a nonprivity builder
alleging that a defect or delay in construction has resulted in purely
economic loss. Not surprisingly, the conflicting theories have pro-
duced a wide and inconsistent range of solutions.
III. A BABEL OF VOICES
Courts have focused primarily on three actions in deciding whether
an injured party may sue for a purely economic loss arising from a
defect or delay in construction: negligence, breach of implied war-
ranty, and negligent misrepresentation.' The availability and nature
88. Id. at 872-74.
89. See Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co., 816 F.2d 110, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1987)
(predicting Pennsylvania law), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987); Florida Power & Light Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla. 1987); Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller,
Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 437 N.W.2d 213, 217-18 (1989). But see City of
Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 976-78 (4th Cir. 1987) (predicting South
Carolina law and adhering to pre-East River position), reh'g denied, 840 F.2d 219 (1988);
Bancorp Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Augusta Aviation Corp., 813 F.2d 272, 277 (9th Cir. 1987)
(predicting Oregon law and adhering to pre-East River position); Washington Water Power Co.
v. Graybar Elec. Co., 112 Wash. 2d 847, 864-66, 774 P.2d 1199, 1209-10 (1989) (adhering to
pre-East River position).
90. Plaintiffs also occasionally, and generally unsuccessfully, sue as third-party beneficiaries
of a contract or under strict liability in tort. Typically, a contractor is regarded as merely an
incidental beneficiary of a contract between an architect and an owner, and therefore unable to
sue as a third party beneficiary. See A.L. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 402-03 (Fla.
1973), overruled on other grounds by Abstract Corp. v. Fernandez Co., 458 So. 2d 766 (Fla.
1984). A provision in the form contract between an architect and owner issued by the American
Institute of Architects, the most commonly used form Architect-Owner Agreement, makes that
status clear. See infra note 262 and accompanying text. But see Prichard Bros. v. Grady Co.,
407 N.W.2d 423, 427-28 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (without explanation, treats general contractor
as third-party beneficiary of owner-architect contract, but concludes that architect did not breach
that agreement), rev'd, 428 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 1988) (en banc).
A subsequent purchaser's right to sue as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the
defendant builder and the original purchaser is dubious, because the subsequent purchaser's
identity was unknown at the time of contracting and the contracting parties therefore did not
intend the contract to benefit her. See Coburn v. Lenox Homes, 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599,
601 (1977). In rare circumstances, however, such as when the builder contracts with a landlord
to renovate the premises of an existing tenant, a third-party beneficiary claim may be viable. See
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 42-44; infra note 98. See also Keel v. Titan Constr. Corp., 639 P.2d
1228, 1231 (Okla. 1982) (owner is third-party beneficiary of contract between general contractor
and architect concerning house to be built for owner).
Judicial unwillingness to use strict liability theory is somewhat surprising because of the
practical and theoretical similarities between strict liability and implied warranty actions,
especially when privity of contract is no longer required for recovery based on an implied
warranty concerning goods. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the
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of these actions vary substantially among the states. Nevertheless,
states can be grouped into six major categories based on the type(s) of
relief available: negligence but not warranty; warranty but not negli-
gence; intermediate negligence (whether or not a warranty action is
also available); negligent misrepresentation available in instances when
negligence is not; both warranty and negligence; and neither negli-
gence nor warranty.
This part of the Article focuses on the decisions of one jurisdiction
within each category. The discussion concerns only whether the non-
privity builder owes a tort or contractual duty to the injured party.91
A. Negligence but Not Warranty: California
Probably the two most frequently cited decisions concerning a non-
privity builder's duty not to negligently cause purely economic loss
come out of California. One of these involved a suit by a contractor
against an architect, the other a suit by a commercial tenant against a
contractor.
In United States v. Rogers & Rogers,92 a general contractor claimed
that the architect had breached its duty to supervise a project by
allowing a subcontractor to use defective concrete. As is typical on
large construction projects, the architect and contractor were not in
privity of contract; each had contracted directly with the owner, the
United States. When the problem was discovered, the architect issued
a stop order, and the subsequent corrective measures and delay alleg-
edly caused the plaintiff substantial loss. 93
Applying a six-factor test used by California courts to determine
whether a defendant has a duty to a noncontractual party to avoid the
negligent infliction of economic loss,94 the United States district court
majority of the courts addressing the issue have rejected claims by subsequent purchasers based
on strict liability when those purchasers have suffered only economic loss. See Barrett, supra
note 1, at 919-22; see also Note, Strict Liability in Tort for Builder-Vendors of Homes, 24 TULSA
L. 117, 128-33 (1988) (discussing several of the decisions ruling on strict liability claims).
91. Courts have barely considered the other elements of a claim: breach of duty, causation
and damages. Only the failure to analyze damage issues has been critical. See infra notes 289-94
and accompanying text (identifying recoverable damages under proposed action).
92. 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
93. Id. at 133-34.
94. The test, first enunciated in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958),
considers (1) the extent to which the transaction is intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff has suffered
injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and (6) the policy of
preventing future harm. 320 P.2d at 19.
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rejected the architect's motion for summary judgment and held that
the architect had a tort duty to the contractor:
Considerations of reason and policy impel the conclusion that the
position and authority of a supervising architect are such that he ought
to labor under a duty to the prime contractor to supervise the project
with due care under the circumstances, even though his sole contractual
relationship is with the owner, here the United States. Altogether too
much control over the contractor necessarily rests in the hands of the
supervising architect for him not to be placed under a duty imposed by
law to perform without negligence his functions as they affect the con-
tractor. The power of the architect to stop the work alone is tanta-
mount to a power of economic life or death over the contractor. It is
only just that such authority, exercised in such a relationship, carry
commensurate legal responsibility.95
About twenty years after Rogers & Rogers, the California Supreme
Court held in J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory96 that a general contractor had a
tort duty to the tenant of a commercial building to complete renova-
tions within a reasonable time, even though the contractor contracted
with the landlord, not the tenant.97 The tenant alleged that, because
of the unreasonable delay in completing the job, it had lost business
and profits.98 The court focused on the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff, the second factor in its six-factor test.99 It distinguished two
prior decisions (not in the construction setting) because the risk of
injury in those cases had been much less foreseeable to the defend-
ants, t"° and held that here, where the tenant was known, the contrac-
95. 161 F. Supp. at 135-36. Whether or not they have adopted the six-factor test, many
courts have followed the district court's analysis in holding that a supervising architect or
engineer has a duty to other builders on a project not to act negligently in supervising the work.
See. e.g., Shoffner Indus. v. W.B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 42 N.C. App. 259, 257 S.E.2d 50, 55-59,
cert. denied, 298 N.C. 296, 259 S.E.2d 301 (1979); Forte Bros. v. National Amusements, 525
A.2d 1301, 1303 (R.I. 1987).
96. 24 Cal. App. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
97. 598 P.2d at 63-64.
98. Id. at 62. The tenant also sued as a third-party beneficiary of the construction contract (it
was an existing tenant, known to the contractor, at the time the construction contract was
entered). Id. The trial court dismissed both claims and the tenant appealed only the negligence
count. Id. The third-party beneficiary claim was not appealed because the tenant's lawyer
regarded it "as a probable loser"; contracts, however, "were never [his] strong point in law
school." Schwartz, supra note 3, at 43. Thus are seminal cases made!
99. 598 P.2d at 64-65.
100. Id.; see Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1960)
(a retirement home that had contracted to provide lifetime medical care to a man injured in an
automobile accident had no claim against the negligent driver for the increased medical bills);
Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1975) (factory
employees had no negligence claim against a railroad whose cargo of bombs exploded, destroying
the factory in which they worked).
956
Vol. 66:937, 1991
Negligent Infliction of Economic Loss
tor could have foreseen that its negligence would result in economic
harm.' 0 ' Subsequently, a California court of appeals permitted a sub-
sequent purchaser who had suffered only economic loss to pursue a
negligence claim against a builder. °2
Although California has led the way in providing relief against non-
privity builders in negligence, it has not looked favorably on claims
based on breach of implied warranty. An implied warranty of fitness
for the buyer's use accompanies the first sale of improved property in
California, but subsequent purchasers may not recover for breach of
the implied warranty: privity is required. 03
A plurality of jurisdictions"° apparently follow California's
approach of permitting a plaintiff to sue a nonprivity builder for
purely economic loss in negligence but not for breach of implied war-
ranty.105 Most of the states which conclude that a nonprivity builder
has a duty to avoid the negligent infliction of economic loss, however,
do not use the six-factor test. °6 Some focus virtually exclusively on
the foreseeability of the harm, 0 7 others on the nature of the duties set
forth in the contract,' and still others on the violation of building
codes or industry standards. 1 9
101. 598 P.2d at 65.
102. Huang v. Garner, 157 Cal. App. 3d 404, 412-14 n.5, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800, 804-05 n.5
(1984).
103. 203 Cal. Rptr. at 808-09.
104. This author has not attempted a comprehensive count of all jurisdictions.
105. See, eg., Cosmopolitan Homes v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Colo. 1983); Coburn v.
Lenox Homes, 73 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599, 600 (1977); Drexel Properties v. Bay Colony Club
Condominium, 406 So. 2d 515, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
106. But see Brown v. Fowler, 279 N.W.2d 907, 909 (S.D. 1979) (applying six-factor test).
107. See ag., Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184, 677 P.2d 1292,
1295-96 (1984) (duty and liability are imposed when the plaintiff and the risk are foreseeable to a
reasonable person); Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assoc., 386 N.W.2d
375, 377 (Minn. CL App. 1986) (professional may be liable in negligence if it fails to use
reasonable skill and judgment and a third party foreseeably and detrimentally relies upon its
services); A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764, 766 (1974) (a
defendant has a duty if his act or omission foreseeably may cause harm to another, even if the
identity of the other and the nature of the harm are unknown).
108. See, eg., Bagwell Coatings, Inc. v. Middle South Energy, 797 F.2d 1298, 1310 (5th Cir.
1986) (under Mississippi law, an architect or engineer may be liable in tort to a third party for
purely economic loss only if it breaches its duty to the principal or employer); Seattle W. Indus.
v. David A. Mowat Co., 110 Wash. 2d 1, 10, 750 P.2d 245, 251 (1988) (the engineer's duty of
care to third parties "extends at least as far as the duties assumed by him in the contract with the
owner," plus any other duties assumed by affirmative conduct).
109. See Burran v. Dambold, 422 F.2d 133, 135 (10th Cir. 1970) (under New Mexico law, a
builder may be liable for negligence per se if it violates the building code, proximately causing
economic loss to a party whom the code is designed to protect); Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber &
Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730, 738 (1989) (a builder may be liable in tort if it violates an
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B. Implied Warranty but Not Negligence: Illinois
Probably the second most common approach when a construction
defect causes only economic loss permits a suit only for breach of an
implied warranty. One of the leading decisions setting out this posi-
tion is the Illinois Supreme Court's Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf' 0
In Redarowicz, the second owner of a house sued the builder-vendor
in negligence and for breach of implied warranty to recover economic
loss arising from the builder's allegedly poor workmanship."' In a
prior decision, the Illinois Supreme Court had held that the owner of a
storage tank had no negligence claim against the manufacturer when
the tank deteriorated prematurely; under the economic loss rule, the
owner's sole remedy was contractual." 21 The court in Redarowicz saw
no reason to treat a disappointed owner of a house differently than the
disappointed owner of a storage tank. 3 The Illinois Supreme Court
subsequently held that these decisions blocked a negligence action
between builders as well.1
4
The homeowner in Redarowicz had a remedy, however. The
implied warranty of habitability, which the builder-vendor had given
to the original purchaser, also ran to the plaintiff as a subsequent pur-
chaser, despite the absence of privity between them. The implied war-
ranty existed independently of a contractual relationship, because of
the homeowner's necessary reliance on the builder's expertise." 5
applicable building code, deviates from industry standards, or constructs housing that it knows
or should know will pose a serious risk of physical harm).
110. 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
111. 441 N.E.2d at 326. The plaintiff also sued for fraud and as a third party beneficiary. Id
The supreme court upheld the dismissal of the fraud claim for failure to allege intent to defraud.
Id. at 331. It permitted the homeowner to proceed on its third-party beneficiary theory, based on
a unique set of facts. Id. at 328. The city in which the house was located had agreed to forego
prosecution of the builder in exchange for the builder's agreement to make necessary repairs to
the house. Id. The homeowner sued as the beneficiary of that agreement. Id. at 327-28.
112. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443, 448-53 (1982).
113. 441 N.E.2d at 327.
114. See Anderson Elec. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 146, 503 N.E.2d 246, 249
(1986) (economic loss doctrine bars electrician's claim that manufacturer of machinery
negligently supervised the electrician's work on the machine). Redarowicz apparently silently
overruled the six-year old decision in Normoyle-Berg & Assoc. v. Village of Deer Creek, 39 Ill.
App. 3d 744, 350 N.E.2d 559 (1976), in which the court held that a general contractor could sue
the supervising engineer for its allegedly negligent supervision. 350 N.E.2d at 561.
115. 441 N.E.2d at 330. The court stated:
While the warranty of habitability has roots in the execution of the contract for sale, we
emphasize that it exists independently. Privity of contract is not required. Like the initial
purchaser, the subsequent purchaser has little opportunity to inspect the construction
methods used in building the home. Like the initial purchaser, the subsequent purchaser is
usually not knowledgeable in construction practices and must, to a substantial degree, rely
upon the expertise of the person who built the home. If construction of a new house is
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A subsequent purchaser may prefer an implied warranty claim to a
negligence claim in one respect: she does not have to prove lack of due
care.116 Even in those states, like Illinois, that permit subsequent
house purchasers to sue builders for defects causing economic loss,
however, other injured parties will find an implied warranty action
inadequate or unavailable.117 Most states that have addressed the
issue, including Illinois,"' hold that implied warranties do not protect
purchasers of commercial property or purchasers for investment pur-
poses. 119 In several states, implied warranties protect only against
defective, its repair costs should be borne by the responsible builder-vendor who created the
latent defect The compelling public policies underlying the implied warranty of habitability
should not be frustrated because of the short intervening ownership of the first purchaser, in
these circumstances the implied warranty of habitability survives a change of hands in the
ownership.
Iad at 330 (citations omitted).
116. In at least some states, however, that benefit may be chimerical. In New Hampshire, for
example, the implied warranty is of "workmanlike quality." Lempke v. Dagenais, 130 N.H. 782,
547 A.2d 290, 291 (1988). It is unclear how the duty to use "workmanlike quality" differs from
the duty not to build negligently.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has struggled with the construction cases. Only two
years before its decision in Lempk, the court had decided that a subsequent purchaser did not
benefit from the implied warranty of workmanlike quality. Ellis v. Robert C. Morris, Inc., 128
N.H. 358, 513 A.2d 951 (1986), overruled by Lempke v. Dagenais, 130 N.H. 782, 547 A.2d 290
(1988). Two years later, only Justice Souter dissented from the reversal. 547 A.2d at 298.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court is not the only state supreme court to somersault on
extending the implied warranty to subsequent purchasers. In Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, 439
So. 2d 670 (Miss. 1983), the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected its own reasoning in three recent
cases and also held that an implied warranty of habitability extended to subsequent purchasers.
Id at 671.
117. The states are approximately evenly split on the issue. Compare Barnes v. Mac Brown &
Co., 342 N.E.2d 619, 620 (Ind. 1976) (implied warranty of habitability runs to subsequent
purchaser because the mobility of our society and the complexity of construction tecimology
make the privity requirement outmoded) and Aronsoha v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92, 484 A.2d 675,
678-79 (1984) (subsequent purchaser benefits from an implied warranty because it is assigned by
the original purchaser unless the contract between the builder and the original purchaser had a
nonassignability clause or the original purchaser intended to retain the warranty rights) with
Coburn v. Lenox Homes, 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599, 601-02 (1977) (although privity is not
required for implied product warranties, it should be for house warranties because the builder is
not insulated by intermediaries from the purchaser, the builder does not solicit buyers through
mass marketing, and houses are generally long-term investments that builders should not foresee
changing ownership rapidly) and Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, 109 Wash. 2d
406, 415-16, 745 P.2d 1284, 1289 (1987) (court has been reluctant to extend the implied
warranty of habitability in general). See generally Mallor, Extension of the Implied Warranty of
Habitability to Purchasers of Used Homes, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 361 (1982).
118. Hopkins v. Hartman, 101 Ill. App. 3d 260, 427 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (1981).
119. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. v. C.F. Murphy & Assocs., 656 S.W.2d 766, 782 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); see, eg., Frickel v. Sunnyside Enters., 106 Wash. 2d 714, 719-20, 725 P.2d 422,
425-26 (1986) (plaintiffs have no implied warranty claim because, among other reasons, they
were investors in the apartment complex, disspelling the notion of unequal bargaining positions).
There are dissenters, however, see Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022, 1031
(1987) (implied warranty of habitability protects subsequent purchaser of three duplexes for
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defects adversely affecting the habitability of the property, not ordi-
nary defects.120 Finally, a builder who has been harmed by another
builder during the construction process has no implied warranty
claim."'
C. Negligence Based on Risk of Physical Injury: Washington
In trying to balance the desire to compensate a party who has suf-
fered economic loss against the policies underlying the economic loss
rule, some courts have adopted intermediate approaches similar to
those used in products liability litigation.122 In these jurisdictions, a
defendant has a duty to avoid negligent infliction of economic loss if
the negligence poses a risk of serious personal injury, even though no
personal injury actually occurs.
The Washington Supreme Court first applied risk of loss analysis to
construction disputes in Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group,
Inc., '23 which involved allegations by a condominium homeowners'
association that the developer-builder's construction defects resulted
in rotten wood in decks and patios. 24 Eleven years before, the same
court in Berg v. General Motors Corp. 125 had adopted a Santor-like
approach 126 when it permitted a commercial fisher to recover profits
lost because his boat was laid up for repairs to its negligently built
motor. 127 The court in Stuart attempted to distinguish Berg, but in
reality severely limited or overruled it, by stating that factors such as
investment purposes), and many states have not addressed the issue at all. The policy
justifications for implied warranties, such as the typical home purchaser's lack of knowledge of
construction and the consequent disparity in bargaining power with the builder, often apply to
sales of commercial real estate, but not as strongly or as uniformly. See Powell & Mallor, supra
note 63, at 331-34 (arguing in favor of extension of implied warranties to sales of commercial
real estate).
120. See Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92, 484 A.2d 675, 681-82 (1984) (implied warranty
of habitability extends only to suitability for living purposes, and plaintiffs have not shown that
the allegedly defective patio was a vital living element in the house); Stuart v. Coldwell Banker
Commercial Group, 109 Wash. 2d at 413-14, 745 P.2d at 1289 (builder-vendor warrants only
that the foundation supporting a house is firm and secure and that the house is structurally safe).
121. Cf Peck & Hoch, Liability of Engineers for Structural Design Errors State of the Art
Considerations in Defining the Standard of Care, 30 VILL. L. REV. 403, 425 (1985) (courts
reluctant to extend implied warranty action against design engineers except in residential
construction setting). The Arizona Supreme Court, however, apparently is willing to recognize
an implied warranty claim by one builder against another. See infra note 145 and accompanying
text.
122. See supra text accompanying note 83.
123. 109 Wash. 2d 406, 745 P.2d 1284 (1987).
124. Id. at 411-12, 745 P.2d at 1287.
125. 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976).
126. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
127. 87 Wash. 2d at 591-94, 555 P.2d at 822-23.
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"the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the
injury arose" determine the availability of tort relief in economic loss
cases. 128 The Stuart court held that the association could pursue only
a contract claim, because the nature of the defect was that the decks
and walkways were not of the quality desired, the risk of personal
injury did not appear great, and the injury stemmed from deteriora-
tion rather than an accident. 129
Several other courts have also focused on the risk of harm, although
they have characterized the risk necessary to support a negligence
duty differently. 3 ' Although some subsequent purchasers who suffer
only economic loss may have negligence claims in these states, few, if
any, builders have claims against other builders under any risk of loss
test. 131
D. Negligent Misrepresentation: Georgia
General contractors and subcontractors file most negligent misrep-
resentation claims, generally against architects or engineers based on
allegedly negligently prepared plans and specifications. Not surpris-
ingly given the Restatement (Second)s recognition of a negligent mis-
representation action,1 32 courts that permit negligence claims against
nonprivity builders to recover economic loss also permit negligent mis-
representation claims to recover similar loss.' 33 Courts that either
deny negligence actions entirely or impose a risk of harm analysis,
however, divide on whether the economic loss rule affects negligent
misrepresentation claims in the same manner as negligent performance
claims.' 34
128. 109 Wash. 2d at 419-21, 745 P.2d at 1291-92.
129. Id. at 421, 745 P.2d at 1292.
130. See Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co.,
308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336, 345 n.5 (1986) (plaintiffmay recover for purely pecuniary loss only if
the negligence created a clear danger of death or personal injury); Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. v.
C.F. Murphy & Assocs., 656 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (architects and contractors
owe a duty to third parties who will foreseeably suffer injury, if the negligently built structure is
"essentially and imminently dangerous to the safety of others .. ") (quoting Begley v. Adaber
Realty & Inv. Co., 358 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1962)).
131. Because all risk of loss tests require that the defect pose a substantial risk of personal
injury to the injured party, even though only economic loss actually occurred, a builder suffering
only economic loss would have to show that the defect causing the loss actually created a
substantial risk of personal injury to it during the construction process.
132. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
133. See Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Nemours Found., 606 F. Supp. 995, 1001 (D. Del. 1985);
Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184, 677 P.2d 1292, 1296-97 (1984).
134. Compare AAA Excavating v. Francis Constr., 678 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(permitting negligent misrepresentation claim for allegedly negligent soil sampling and soil
compaction tests) with Widett v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 815 F.2d 885, 886-87 (2d
961
Washington Law Review
A decision from a federal district court applying Georgia law dra-
matizes the distinction between negligent performance and misrepre-
sentation claims. 135 A general contractor alleged that it had suffered
economic loss because the project engineer had negligently prepared
its drawings of bridges for an interstate highway and negligently
delayed its review of shop drawings submitted by the contractor. The
court granted the engineer's motion for summary judgment on the
negligence claim for delay in reviewing the drawings, based on the
economic loss doctrine. 136 Relying on a prior decision of the Georgia
Supreme Court, 13 7 however, the court denied the motion for summary
judgment on the claim based on the negligently prepared drawings.
The economic loss doctrine does not apply to negligent misrepresenta-
tion claims in Georgia. 3 '
In contrast, the Maryland Supreme Court has stated that it uses the
same standards to determine whether a duty exists in negligence and
negligent misrepresentation cases. 139 An intimate nexus between the
parties, such as contractual privity, is required, or the negligence must
create a risk of death or severe personal injury."4° In dictum, however,
the court recently has indicated that a manufacturer may have an inti-
mate nexus with an architect that had read and allegedly relied on the
manufacturer's description of its wall system in a commercial publica-
tion."' The court did not mention any facts suggesting that the reli-
ance created a risk of personal injury, and the relationship between
advertiser and subscriber fell far short of contractual privity. This
suggests that in Maryland as well, plaintiff builders may bring negli-
gent misrepresentation claims even when they cannot bring negligence
claims.
Cir. 1987) (although New York courts recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation against
accountants, they have rejected similar claims against architects in at least three cases).
135. Malta Constr. Co. v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 902, 906
(N.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd, 927 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 932 F.2d 979 (11th Cir.
1991).
136. Id. at 907.
137. Robert & Co. Assocs. v. Rhodes-Haverty Partnership, 250 Ga. 680, 300 S.E.2d 503
(1983).
138. Malta Constr. Co. v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, Inc., 694 F. Supp. at 907.
139. See Village of Cross Keys v. United States Gypsum Co., 315 Md. 741, 556 A.2d 1126,
1132 (1989).
140. See 556 A.2d at 1131; Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756, 759-60
(1986).
141. Village of Cross Keys v. United States Gypsum Co., 556 A.2d at 1134.
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E. Both Warranty and Negligence: Arizona
Several states are plaintiffs' paradises; they permit suits against non-
privity builders for economic loss under both negligence and implied
warranty theories, although in some instances with peculiar twists.
Arizona is one such state.
The Arizona Supreme Court addressed suits among builders in its
1984 decision Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland. 142 Don-
nelly, a general contractor, alleged that it detrimentally relied on the
defective site plans and specifications prepared by Oberg/Hunt/Gile-
land, an architectural firm, in readying its bid and performing its
work. The Arizona Supreme Court permitted Donnelly to proceed
under three different theories: negligence,' 43 negligent misrepresenta-
tion, 1" and breach of implied warranty that the architects had pre-
pared the plans and specifications in a reasonable, non-negligent
manner.145
About one month earlier, the Arizona Supreme Court had extended
the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent house purchas-
ers. 'I Still later in 1984, however, the Arizona Court of Appeals held
that a subsequent purchaser has no negligence claim against a builder-
vendor. 47  The court did not try to distinguish Donnelly.' 48  The
result is that, in Arizona, builders have a panoply of actions available,
while subsequent owners may sue for breach of implied warranty only.
Other states, by contrast, allow builders to sue for negligence and sub-
sequent owners to sue both for negligence and breach of implied
warranty. '49
142. 139 Ariz. 184, 677 P.2d 1292 (1984).
143. 677 P.2d at 1295-96.
144. Ia at 1296-97.
145. Id at 1297. Donnelly may be the only reported decision from any jurisdiction that
concludes that a builder impliedly warrants the quality of its work to another builder.
146. Richards v. Powercraft Homes, 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427, 430 (1984).
147. Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes, 142 Ariz. 439, 690 P.2d 158, 163-64 (1984).
148. In 1988, however, the same court denied a tort action to the subsequent purchaser. It
distinguished Donnelly stating, "Donnelly did not involve a claim of negligent construction nor a
claim of implied warranty of workmanlike performance and habitability." Colberg v. Rellinger,
160 Ariz. 42, 770 P.2d 346, 351 (1988). This explanation leaves much to be desired. Donnelly
did involve a claimed breach of implied warranty. 677 P.2d at 1294. Possibly, the appellate
court intended to distinguish negligent preparation of architectural plans as in Donnelly from
negligent construction, on the basis that the former involves a negligent misrepresentation. If so,
that distinction is left completely undeveloped.
149. See, ag., Bagwell Coatings, Inc. v. Middle South Energy, 797 F.2d 1298, 1310 (5th Cir.
1986) (under Mississippi law, an architect or engineer may be liable in negligence to a
subcontractor suffering purely economic loss); Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, 439 So. 2d 670,
672-73 (Miss. 1983) (subsequent owner may sue a builder-vendor for negligence or breach of
implied warranty).
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F Neither Negligence Nor Warranty: New York
The approach adopted by the fewest states denies relief under both
negligence and warranty theories. Although its highest court has not
addressed all of the issues discussed in this Article, New York appar-
ently follows this approach, with an important exception.
In Widett v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 150 a grading sub-
contractor sued a project architect, claiming that the architect had
negligently misrepresented the elevations of the site, causing the sub-
contractor to incur additional cost in fulfilling its contract. The sub-
contractor contended that the New York Court of Appeals had
relaxed the privity requirement for negligent misrepresentation suits.
Based on four state court opinions, the Second Circuit held, however,
that the relaxed requirement does not extend to suits against
architects. 1 5 1
Although a builder apparently has no negligent misrepresentation
claim absent privity, it may have a negligent supervision claim. One
year after its decision in Widett, the Second Circuit in Morse/Diesel
Inc. v. Trinity Industries'52 dismissed economic loss claims filed by
two subcontractors on a hotel construction project against three other
subcontractors. It stated in dicta, however, that the plaintiffs could
have advanced claims absent privity if the defendants had the duty to
manage, supervise and inspect the construction, because the supervi-
sory duties would have inured to the benefit of the plaintiffs as well as
the owner of the project. 153 Under appropriate facts, therefore, a
builder presumably can advance a negligent supervision claim in New
York. 154
Subsequent purchasers of improvements apparently face greater
obstacles. The rule requiring privity to sue for economic loss pre-
cludes negligence claims.155 New York's highest court only recently
created an implied warranty of habitability for the benefit of home-
owners,1 56 and has not yet addressed its extension to subsequent pur-
chasers. In reaching its conclusion that the original purchasers
benefited from an implied warranty, however, the court cited with
150. 815 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1987).
151. Id. at 887.
152. 859 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1988).
153. Id. at 247-48. The defendants in Morse/Diesel did not have general supervisory powers,
however, requiring dismissal. Id. at 248-49.
154. New York apparently is the only state which treats at least one type of negligent
performance claim more favorably than a negligent misrepresentation claim.
155. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
156. Caceci v. Di Canio Constr. Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52, 526 N.E.2d 266, 530 N.Y.S.2d 771
(1988).
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approval lower court decisions distinguishing "between contracts for
the sale of completed houses and contracts for the construction and
sale of a new home, [and] holding that an implied warranty of good
and skillful construction exists only as to the latter."1"7 The distinc-
tion is justified, because "[w]hen a buyer signs a contract prior to con-
struction of a house, inspection of premises is an impossibility ... "158
A subsequent purchaser, obviously, can inspect a house prior to
purchase. The implied warranty, therefore, probably will not extend
to subsequent purchasers." 9
IV. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF ECONOMIC LOSS BY
BUILDERS
As shown above, judicial dispositions of economic loss claims
against nonprivity builders, taken collectively, verge on incoherence.
This part of the Article suggests a replacement for the present intellec-
tual chaos by developing the elements of a tort of negligent infliction
of economic loss applicable to both types of construction cases. This
tort would treat negligent performance and negligent misrepresenta-
tion claims identically. 6 The elements of the tort will be developed
and explained in several steps. Subsection A posits that any action
against a nonprivity builder to recover economic loss should protect
the injured party's reliance on the builder, not that party's expecta-
tions. Subsection B develops the argument that builders should have a
duty to subsequent purchasers as long as liability is limited to a deter-
minate amount for a determinate time to a determinate class: subse-
quent purchasers generally will lack an adequate remedy otherwise,
and microeconomic analysis suggests that imposing a duty on builders
actually fosters economic efficiency. A similar analysis is pursued in
157. 526 N.E.2d at 269 (citations omitted).
158. Id. New York's implied warranty law continues to be restricted to a scope that other
jurisdictions transcended in the 1950s and 1960s. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
159. Missouri courts first enunciated and then silently backed away from a position that
denied any remedy in tort or contract. In Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978),
overruled on other grounds by Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.,
703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986), for example, the Missouri Supreme Court held that a subsequent
purchaser had no contract claim against a builder because of the absence of privity, and no
negligence claim because of the inappropriateness of tort remedies without personal injury or
property damage. Id at 882-84. Five years later, however, the Missouri Court of Appeals
permitted a claim when a structure is "essentially and imminently dangerous to the safety of
others," even though the plaintiffs suffered only economic loss. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. v.
C.F. Murphy & Assocs., 656 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Begley v. Adaber
Realty & Inv. Co., 358 S.W.2d 785, 791 (Mo. 1962)).
160. States may choose to provide additional protection through implied warranties. See
infra text accompanying note 316.
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Subsection C for suits among builders. Based on the considerations
identified in the previous three sections, Subsection D sets out the ele-
ments of the tort and shows that this action meets the essential needs
of plaintiffs while avoiding the risks of indeterminacy. Finally, the
proposed action is briefly defended against two types of attack in Sub-
section E.
A. Plaintiff's Reliance Interest
Courts and commentators disagree about the interests plaintiffs seek
to protect when they claim that a nonprivity builder's negligence
caused them economic loss. Advocates of the economic loss rule often
define "economic loss" in terms of the plaintiff's expectations. 61  For
example, one author states that "economic loss" is "the loss of an
expectancy interest created by contract, often described as the 'benefit
of the bargain.' "162 Courts imposing a duty to avoid the negligent
infliction of economic loss often do not identify the interest to be pro-
tected at all, but speak in general terms of foreseeable harm. 163 When
an interest is identified, it generally is the plaintiff's reliance on the
defendant. 16
Courts have less difficulty with related claims. Implied warranties
protect the purchaser's reliance, 165 and the Restatement (Second) of
161. See, e.g., Anderson Elec. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 115 Il. 2d 146, 503 N.E.2d 246,
249 (1986); Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, Culinary Workers Union, Local No. 226 v.
Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (1982); Carolina Winds Owners Ass'n v. Joe Harden
Builder, Inc., 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1988) overruled in part, Kennedy v. Columbia
Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 384 S.E.2d 730, 736 (1989).
162. Barrett, supra note 1, at 895.
163. See, e.g., Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184, 677 P.2d 1292,
1295-96 (1984); Coburn v. Lenox Homes, 73 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599, 602-03 (1977).
164. See, e.g., Shoffner Indus. v. W.B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 42 N.C. App. 259, 257 S.E.2d 50,
59, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 296, 259 S.E.2d 301 (1979); Forte Bros. v. Nat'l Amusements, 525
A.2d 1301, 1303 (R.I. 1987).
One court addressed the protected interest in a related context. In Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So.
2d 654 (Fla. 1983), the court refused to extend an implied warranty of fitness to purchasers of
residential lots, the only pre-purchase improvement of which had been a sea wall that collapsed
post-purchase. The court ruled in favor of the defendant developer partly because of the nature
of the damages claimed. For example, one plaintiff had purchased a lot for $28,000, sold it with
the damaged wall for $31,500, and sought $6,500 in damages based on the asking price for
similar lots with an undamaged wall. The court stated, "Protection against this kind of loss,
based merely upon an expectancy, was not intended by this Court when it adopted" the implied
warranty. Id. at 659.
165. See, e.g., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330 (1982) (The
subsequent purchaser, like the initial purchaser "is usually not knowledgeable in construction
practices and must, to a substantial degree, rely upon the expertise of the person who built the
home. If construction of a new house is defective, its repair costs should be borne by the
responsible builder-vendor who created the latent defect.").
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Torts gives a claim to one who justifiably relies on a negligent misrep-
resentation. 166 By and large, therefore, opponents of relief contend
that proponents protect expectations, while proponents, to the extent
that they consider the issue, believe that they protect the plaintiff's
reliance. The disagreement reflects a collision not only between con-
tract and tort law, but also between conceptions of normal human
interactions.
Contract law traditionally protected parties' expectations. Entering
into a contract entitled the promisee to performance of the promise,
including, if the promisee had struck a favorable bargain, the benefit of
that bargain. Even if the promisee had taken no action in reliance on
the contract and the promisor had not realized any benefit from it, the
parties had a full complement of rights and obligations.167 By con-
trast, if a contract had not been entered into, but one party to the
contractual negotiations acted in reliance on the other's promise, that
party had no remedy.168
This protection of the parties' expectations grows out of the idea
that they autonomously exercise powers of free choice in deciding to
enter the contract.169 A promisee may treat a contractual promise as
equivalent to having the action performed, unless the reason for non-
performance falls within one of the excuses acceptable under tradi-
tional contract law.17° The promisor otherwise bears responsibility for
deciding not to or failing to perform. This is not unfair to the prom-
isor, who freely elects to enter the transaction. Nor is the refusal to
166. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1976).
167. The classic case of Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954) provides a
dramatic example. The court concluded that the Zehmers contracted to sell their farm to Lucy
over drinks at a local restaurant. Before Lucy left, Zehmer told him that it was all a joke, and
that they had no agreement. Even though Lucy had not relied on the contract before this
notification, the court held that it was enforceable. 84 S.E.2d at 522.
168. See, eg., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 345-46 (2d Cir. 1933) (L.
Hand, J.) (material supplier who quoted a price for linoleum to a general contractor, who in turn
submitted a lump sum bid to the owner based on that price quotation, could withdraw the
quotation prior to its acceptance by the general contractor, even though the contractor had relied
upon it in submitting its bid). See generally Metzger & Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and
Reliance on Illusory Promises, 44 Sw. L.J. 841, 849-51, 853-54, 856-57 (1990) (discussing
unenforceability of reliance on a gratuitous, indefinite, or illusory promise under traditional
contract doctrine).
169. See P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 40-41 (1979).
Atiyah describes the rise of contractual theory: "In short, what was new in contractual theory
was not the idea of a relationship involving mutual rights and duties, but the idea that the
relationship was created by, and depended on, the free choice of the individuals involved in it."
Id. at 41.
170. For discussion of the various grounds on which parties may be excused from contractual
obligations, see E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS chs. 4, 5, 6, 9 (2d ed. 1990).
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enforce a non-contractual promise unfair to the promisee, who freely
assumes the risk of relying upon it.17 1
The conception of humans as autonomous actors that undergirds
traditional contract law is waning. For many reasons, including the
increasing dependence of individuals on huge business and govern-
mental units172 and the growing number and influence of academics
and other professionals, many of whose jobs involve the identification
of various influences on human actions,' 73 an individual (or entity)
now generally is perceived not as autonomous, but as pushed and pul-
led by a large number of often unrecognized forces.1 74 Put another
way, persons are continuously influenced by, and must continuously
rely on, others, whether or not they even know them.
Not surprisingly, the concept of reliance traditionally associated
with tort law has assumed increasing importance in commercial and
consumer litigation. Scholars have argued that contracts should be
enforced not to prevent frustrated expectations, but primarily because
of reliance upon them. 175 More important to litigation results, reli-
ance-based actions increasingly intrude into realms previously gov-
erned almost exclusively by contract law.
Misrepresentation claims provide one example. Scienter is no
longer a prerequisite for a misrepresentation action. This Article has
already discussed the development of the negligent misrepresentation
action, 176 and some courts also recognize strict liability misrepresenta-
tion claims, especially in transactions involving the sale, lease or
exchange of property. 177
The rise of promissory estoppel provides a more celebrated exam-
ple. 178 Originally, it may have evolved as a means of enforcing gratui-
171. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 169, at 761. Obviously, the protection of expectations may
have alternative justifications, including economic efficiency. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 79-85 (3d ed. 1986).
172. See Metzger & Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and the Evolution of Contract Law, 18 AM.
Bus. L.J. 139, 200-06 (1980).
173. See J. KOCKA, WHITE COLLAR WORKERS IN AMERICA 1890-1940: A SOCIAL-
POLITICAL HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 44-46 (1980) (discussing growth of
professional class).
174. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 169, at 743. The forces may be internal, as in Freud's
theories of behavior, or external, as in Marx' theories of social change.
175. See id. at 4-6. This perception reaches far beyond legal scholars. Many of the author's
first-year students initially wish to explain liability in cases decided under traditional contract
doctrine by the promisee's adverse reliance.
176. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g.. Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 288 N.W.2d 95, 99 (1980). Claims
for strict liability misrepresentation are recognized at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 552C (1976).
178. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 55-74 (1974).
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tous promises, especially charitable subscriptions, on which the
promisee relied.179 Neither Restatement of Contracts, however, limits
promissory estoppel to gratuitous promises, and promissory estoppel
now applies to a wide range of commercial disputes."' 0 Reasonable
reliance makes promises enforceable not only when there is no consid-
eration, but also when they are indefinite, illusory,"' or fall within the
Statute of Frauds.182
Whether an action for negligent infliction of economic loss protects
expectations or reliance has more than theoretical importance. It may
affect whether a particular plaintiff has a claim and the damages recov-
erable, as demonstrated by the following hypotheticals.
The original owner of a five-year old office building worth
$11,000,000 is in dire straits, and a real estate developer agrees to
purchase it for $10,000,000. The contract contains an inspection con-
tingency. The inspector discovers that the original builder negligently
constructed the foundation, which will cost $2,000,000 to repair. The
owner refuses to reduce the purchase price and the developer with-
draws based on its contingency. The developer then sues the builder,
claiming $1,000,000 in lost profits.
Second, based on plans and specifications prepared by an architect,
a contractor agrees to construct an office building for $8,000,000,
anticipating $500,000 in profits. Before the contractor incurs any
costs or enters any contracts with subcontractors, the owner discovers
that the plans and specifications are defective. The owner, having lost
confidence in the architect, decides not to build. The contractor sues
the architect, claiming $500,000 in lost profits.
If courts protect the purchaser's and contractor's expectations, they
will have claims; if only their reliance interests are protected, they will
not. The interest to be protected determines the existence of a claim.
In almost all reported decisions concerning negligent infliction of
economic loss by builders, however, the plaintiff has partly or com-
pletely performed its contractual obligations before discovery of the
179. See Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898); Allegheny College v.
National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173, 174-75 (1927) (Cardozo, J.)
(dictum).
180. See eg., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958)
(subcontractor estopped from withdrawing bid when general contractor used that bid in
preparing its own bid, which was accepted by the owner); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis.
2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965) (grocery store chain estopped from denying its promises that led
potential franchisees to sell their existing facilities at a loss and move to another town).
181. Metzger & Phillips, supra note 168, at 853-66.




defect. The plaintiff therefore has a claim regardless of whether the
court protects its expectations or reliance.
The identity of the interest to be protected may affect more fre-
quently the amount of damages recoverable. Change the second hypo-
thetical, so that the contractor has incurred $25,000 in costs before the
owner discovers that the plans are defective. In promissory estoppel
cases, courts generally have permitted the promisee to recover on the
promise, either to protect its expectations or its "hidden" reliance
costs, 8 3 despite scholarly and occasional judicial contentions that the
promisee typically should recover only its damages in reliance on the
promise.'8 4 The same two damage theories-recovery limited to reli-
ance damages or recovery based on the injured party's expectations-
may apply to claims of negligent infliction of economic loss. The the-
ory adopted will make a substantial difference. In the hypothetical,
for example, the difference would be between a $500,000 and a
$25,000 recovery." 5
The most important factor in deciding between the expectation and
reliance interests is that the factual situation giving rise to a claim is
inconsistent with liability under the view of human interactions sup-
porting traditional contract doctrine.'8 6 Consider first a subsequent
purchaser's claim. The builder's liability, if any, does not arise from a
voluntarily entered business relationship. A subsequent purchaser
generally can discover prior to closing who constructed an improve-
ment, and therefore arguably voluntarily elects to enter into a relation-
ship with that builder.'8 7 The builder does not voluntarily enter into a
relationship with the subsequent purchaser, however; it does not know
183. See Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1981) (permitting
recovery of lost profits); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (promise should
be enforced, although remedy may be limited as justice requires); Wangerin, Damages for
Reliance Across the Spectrum of Law: Of Blind Men and Legal Elephants 72 IOWA L. REV. 47,
49, 89-94 (1986) (although scholars believe that the Restatements enunciated a flexible remedy in
promissory estoppel cases, courts generally have awarded damages based on expectations).
184. See, e.g., Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d at 276-77; Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex.
1965); Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1979). See generally Metzger &
Phillips, supra note 168, at 851-53 (discussing damages recoverable in promissory estoppel
cases).
185. For reasons developed subsequently, the plaintiff's recovery should be limited to
$25,000. See infra notes 289-94 and accompanying text (discussing damages).
186. Unfortunately, the broad theoretical conflict in the economic loss cases makes
identification of a metatheoretical measuring stick to decide between the two interests impossible.
Cf T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 92-110, 198-99 (2d ed. 1970)
(scientists have no metatheoretical measuring stick to judge between competing paradigms).
187. Probably very few subsequent purchasers, especially of residential properties, actually
know the identity of the property's builders.
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at the time of construction who will subsequently purchase the
" building.
Even if the builder and subsequent purchaser are deemed to have
voluntarily entered a non-contractual business relationship, the latter
does not have any justifiable expectations of profit from it. Profits are
realized from contractual relationships. A subsequent purchaser may
expect gain from her purchase contract with her seller, her eventual
contract for the sale of the property, her contracts with employees
working on the property, and her contracts to acquire and sell goods
and services. Unexpected building repair costs will diminish those
expected profits, because when entering some or all of those contracts,
the subsequent purchaser depended on the building having been con-
structed in a reasonable manner. The subsequent purchaser's reliance
on the adequacy of the services previously provided by the builder to
the original purchaser, rather than the builder's autonomous act of
entering a relationship with the subsequent purchaser, is the source of
liability.
The analysis is similar for disputes based on allegedly faulty plans
and specifications. Generally, the architect enters into a contract with
the owner and prepares the plans and specifications, which the owner
uses to solicit bids from potential general contractors.'88 Whether or
not the architect assists the owner in selecting the contractor,"8 9 the
architect does not know the identity of the general contractor at the
time that the plans are prepared. The architect has no more volunta-
rily entered into a relationship with the general contractor than has
the builder voluntarily entered into a relationship with the subsequent
purchaser. The general contractor has no more expectations of profits
from its reliance on the adequacy of those plans than the subsequent
owner has from its reliance on the adequacy of the builder's original
construction.
At first blush, a builder claiming that an architect negligently per-
formed its supervisory duties may seem more deserving of having its
expectations protected. The architect knows the identity of the con-
tractor when performing those duties, and "[t]he power of the archi-
tect to stop the work alone is tantamount to a power of economic life
188. See D. HAPKE, DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS: REPRESENTING THE
OWNER 1-2, 24 (1987).
189. The architect "shall assist the Owner in obtaining bids or negotiated proposals and assist
in awarding and preparing contracts for construction." American Institute of Architects,
Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect, A.I.A. Doc. B141 § 2.5.1. (1987)
[hereinafter Architect-Owner Agreement].
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or death over the contractor." 19' But the architect does not know the
identity of the contractor when it assumes the contractual obligation
to supervise construction, and the contractor's expectations of profits
arise from the spread between the contract price with the owner and
the amounts it agrees to pay to its employees, subcontractors and
material suppliers. The contractor's reliance on the architect's super-
vision is essentially no different than its reliance on the architect's
plans and specifications. 91
The arguments for protection of the reliance interest receive addi-
tional support from the rationales underlying negligent misrepresenta-
tion and implied warranty actions. Both originate in adverse reliance.
To recover for a negligent misrepresentation, an injured party must
suffer loss in "justifiable reliance" on the information, 192 and may
recover the difference between the value received and the purchase
price and any other pecuniary loss suffered in reliance on the misrepre-
sentation, but not the benefit of his bargain.193
The purposes and elements of a negligent misrepresentation action
are especially significant because of the difficulty in distinguishing the
action from a negligent performance action. 94 An architect's failure
to adhere4o professional standards of care while preparing plans and
specifications may result either from negligent design work or negli-
gent depiction of the designs on paper. Either cause of the negligent
misrepresentation can be characterized as negligent performance of
the architectural services. Indeed, many courts have analyzed cases
involving negligent plans in terms of negligence rather than negligent
190. United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132, 136 (S.D. Ca. 1958).
191. Without detrimental reliance, a builder should have no'claim. For example, although
the Florida Supreme Court had earlier stated that an architect could be liable to another builder
for its negligent plans or supervision, A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 402 (Fla.
1973), overruled on other grounds by Abstract Corp. v. Fernandez Co., 458 So. 2d 766 (Fla.
1984), the Florida Court of Appeals in 1989 refused to hold that a roofing consultant had a duty
to a roofing subcontractor. E.C. Goldman, Inc. v. A/R/C Assocs., 543 So. 2d 1268, 1270-72
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). After the subcontractor had completed its work, the owner engaged
the consultant to advise it whether the work merited payment. Unlike in Moyer, the roofing
subcontractor did not rely on the consultant. Indeed, the subcontractor did not even know that
the consultant would have any role until after it had completed its work.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1976).
193. Id. § 552B.
194. See Village of Cross Keys v. United States Gypsum Co., 315 Md. 741, 556 A.2d 1126,
1132 (1989) (a negligent misrepresentation claim is stated if the duty allegedly breached involves
"due care in obtaining and communicating information upon which [the other] party may
reasonably be expected to rely..." regardless of the reason that the information was erroneous)
(quoting United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 706 (1961)).
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misrepresentation. 195 Conversely, a negligent construction claim can
be recharacterized as a breach of an implied representation, negli-
gently made, that the property is fit. 196
Similarly, courts extend implied warranties to original and subse-
quent purchasers of new houses in recognition of property owners'
reliance on the builders who construct improvements. The original
purchaser "must rely in great part upon the expertise of the builder
who holds himself out as competent to construct the consumer's
home."' 197 The same applies to subsequent purchasers. "[L]ike an ini-
tial buyer, the subsequent purchaser has little opportunity to inspect
and little experience and knowledge about construction."'' 19
For these reasons, any action against a nonprivity builder to recover
economic loss arising from defects or delay in construction should
protect the injured party's reliance on the builder, not its expectations
arising from contracts with others. The next two sections address
whether and under what conditions courts should protect the injured
party's reliance.
B. Suits by Nonbuilders Against Nonprivity Builders
This section analyzes claims by a subsequent purchaser against a
nonprivity builder for negligent infliction of economic loss. 199 It
begins with the prospect that the subsequent purchaser generally will
have no viable claims against any other party if the builder's negli-
gence causes her economic loss. Next, microeconomic analysis is uti-
lized to show that imposing a duty on builders to a subsequent
purchaser actually will foster efficient decisionmaking, so long as the
action can be structured to avoid three primary risks: an indeterminate
class of plaintiffs, an indeterminate period of liability, and an indeter-
minate amount of damages, the very same risks identified by Justice
195. Se ag., Mayor and City Council v. Clark-Dietz & Assocs.-Eng'rs, 550 F. Supp. 610,
623-24 (N.D. Miss. 1982) (applying Mississippi law), appeal denied, 702 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1983);
A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 398-402; Milton J. Womack, Inc. v. House of
Representatives, 509 So. 2d 62, 64-67 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
196. Negligent construction frequently results in implied warranty claims. See supra notes
110-21 and accompanying text (discussing implied warranty claims arising from defective
residential construction). Such claims are the contractual analogues to negligent or innocent
misrepresentation claims.
197. Grotfv. Pete Kingsley Bldg., Inc., 374 Pa. Super. 377, 543 A.2d 128, 132 (1988), appeal
dismissed, 567 A.2d 1041 (1990).
198. See Lempke v. Dagenais, 130 N.H. 782, 547 A.2d 290, 295 (1988).
199. Claims by tenants or by parties with no ownership or possessory interest in an
improvement are also briefly discussed, see infra notes 245-47 (tenant) and 248 (person with no
ownership or possessory interest) and accompanying text. To simplify the analysis, however, the
discussion focuses on the subsequent purchaser.
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Cardozo in Ultramares. Courts, therefore, should recognize an action
fashioned to avoid those risks.
1. Alternatives to Direct Action Against Builder
Creating a new action directly against a builder may be unwar-
ranted if subsequent purchasers or other nonbuilders who suffer eco-
nomic loss because of construction defects generally have adequate
remedies against others. Without a direct action against a builder,
however, these injured parties generally lack any effective remedy.
Two potential problems facing an injured party arise relatively
infrequently and require little discussion. The most logical candidate
for a subsequent purchaser to sue, other than a builder, is the seller,
but that person may be insolvent. Moreover, the statute of limitations
may have expired on any contract claims.2°°
More importantly, a subsequent purchaser and other nonbuilders
generally have no protection, contractual or otherwise, if they cannot
sue a builder for negligent construction. Proponents of the economic
loss rule point to three sources of contractual protection for a subse-
quent purchaser: the seller, a professional inspector, and a third party
insurer.20' Each is discussed below.
Seller. A subsequent purchaser generally has no claim in contract
or tort against the seller for any defects latent and unknown to the
seller at the time of the subsequent owner's purchase. No jurisdiction
has imposed implied warranties of habitability on owners who did not
build or develop the improvement.2 °2 Because the original purchaser
did not construct the allegedly defective structure, it is not liable for
any negligence in that construction. Negligent misrepresentation is
unavailable if the original purchaser had no reason to be aware of the
defect.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 552C suggests a possible
theory of liability if the seller innocently-that is, neither fraudulently
nor negligently-misrepresents material facts.203 Most jurisdictions,
200. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
201. See Barrett, supra note 1, at 933-35.
202. See Solomon v. Birger, 19 Mass. App. 634, 477 N.E.2d 137, 141 n.7 (1985) (warranties
of habitability are not normally implied when the seller is not the builder or developer); Obaydou
v. Ujvari, 536 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779, 146 A.D.2d 518, 519 (1989) (memorandum decision) (seller of
existing cooperative apartment does not give an implied warranty of habitability to purchaser);
Powell & Mallor, supra note 63, at 318.
203. The first paragraph of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (1976) reads:
One who, in a sale, rental or exchange transaction with another, makes a misrepresentation
of a material fact for the purpose of inducing the other to act or to refrain from acting in
reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other for pecuniary loss caused to him by his
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however, will probably not find a seller liable under section 552C if the
misrepresentation occurs by silence. In those jurisdictions, for exam-
ple, an innocent failure to mention an unknown defect in a septic sys-
tem will not create liability, while an affirmative statement, such as
that the septic system is fine, may be tortious if untrue.2"
Only express warranty remains. No legal obstacle prevents a buyer
from obtaining an express warranty. Nevertheless, very rarely, if ever,
will a property owner warrant to a purchaser that improvements are
free of all defects. Form contracts used by brokers typicilly provide
that the property is sold "as is"205 or that the seller warrants that he
has no notice or knowledge of any defect.2" 6 Attorneys generally use
similar language, and almost never negotiate a warranty that improve-
ments are free of defects.2 "7 Obviously, a warranty stating that a seller
has neither notice nor knowledge of any defect does not provide a
justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though it is not made fraudulently or
negligently.
204. For example, the generally pro-consumer Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to decide
whether purchasers of a residential lot had a claim against the developer for negligent
misrepresentation in failing to disclose the existence of an underground well. Ollerman v.
O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 288 N.W.2d 95, 112 (1980). The allegations in Ollennan favored
liability more than the typical sale from original purchaser to subsequent purchaser in two
respects: the seller was in the business of selling lots, and he allegedly knew or should have
known of the well. The court nevertheless decided that it needed a full factual record before
imposing a duty to speak. *
205. See, ag., Legal News (Toledo, Ohio), Real Estate Purchase Agreement, Form No. 37,
§ 3 (revised 5-25-89) (Purchaser... acknowledges inspection of said premises and knows the
condition thereof, and is purchasing the premises... in an 'as is' condition, based on said
personal inspection and not in reliance upon any statements or representations of Seller or their
agent.").
206. The standard residential offer to purchase form approved by the Wisconsin Department
of Regulation and Licensing provides:
Seller warrants and represents to Buyer that Seller has no notice or knowledge of any:
(c) underground storage tanks or any structural, mechanical, or other defects of material
significance affecting the property, including but not limited to inadequacy for normal
residential use of mechanical systems, waste disposal systems and well, unsafe well water
according to state standards, and the presence of any dangerous or toxic materials or
conditions affecting the property.
WB-11 Residential Offer to Purchase, approved by Wisconsin Department of Regulation and
Licensing, ll. 82, 86-89, (3-1-88) (mandatory use date).
207. The many contracts for the sale of improved real estate by a nonbuilder included in the
seminal collection of forms for business transactions, J. RABmcN & M. JOHNSON, CURRENT
LEGAL FORMS wrrH TAX ANALYSis (1990), do not contain one warranty as to the structural
soundness of the improvements. The majority of the contracts, both residential and commercial,
provide for the sale to be "as is." See, ag., 8A . RABKiN & M. JOHNSON, form 21.13, § 22; form
21.15, § 8; form 21.18, §§ 7, 16; form 21.30, § 16. Two contain warranties that the seller has no
knowledge of any defect. Id form 21.14, § 5(d); form 21.28, § 13. Others contain
representations that the property will not be in worse condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted,
than when inspected by the purchaser or on the date of contracting. Id form 21.32A, § 10(d);
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claim to the purchaser unless the seller actually did possess such
notice or knowledge.
Sellers' unwillingness to warrant against defects is hardly surprising.
After selling property, sellers do not want a continuing risk of a claim.
Given the well established practices and the aversion of sellers to war-
ranting against defects, such a warranty probably would be prohibi-
tively expensive.
Professional inspector. Increasingly persons interested in purchasing
residential and commercial property make their obligations to close
contingent on inspection of the property by a professional inspector.2 °s
Inspectors' services, although valuable, do not eliminate the advantage
of having a direct action against builders.
As a preliminary matter, courts appear unlikely to make profes-
sional inspections a prerequisite to a negligence claim. Implied war-
ranties protect purchasers only against latent defects that a reasonable
inspection performed by the purchaser prior to purchase would not
have disclosed."° Several courts have rejected arguments that a defect
was not latent if a professional inspector could have discovered it.21
Such an approach expresses an unwillingness to hold purchasers to a
standard that would require the additional monetary expenditure asso-
ciated with inspection.
Even if all purchasers used professional inspectors, however, inspec-
tions would not adequately substitute for an action against builders for
two reasons. First, the exercise of due care will not reveal all latent
defects, especially those not disclosed by a visual inspection.21' Sec-
form 21.35B, § 4(a). The most that any seller warrants is that specified utility systems will be in
good working condition on the date of closing. Id. form 21.19, § 4; form 21.21, § 15.
The author's experience is consistent. After six years of real estate transactional work, he is
unaware of any transaction in which a seller of residential or commercial property warranted
more than that the seller had no notice or knowledge of any defect. The few times the author
represented a seller who received an offer with an absolute warranty, the counteroffer changing
the warranty to "no notice or knowledge" was never challenged.
208. See Rosenthal, Should Your Client Get a Professional Home Inspection?, PRAc. REAL
EsT. LAW. 79, 79-80 (Nov. 1986) (concerning residential transactions). In the author's
experience, commercial purchasers make their obligations to close contingent on inspections
more often than home purchasers.
209. See, e.g., Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92, 484 A.2d 675, 679 (1984); Moxley v.
Laramie Builders, 600 P.2d 733, 736 (Wyo. 1979).
210. See Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa. Super. 11, 476 A.2d 427, 433 (1984); Frickel v. Sunnyside
Enters., 106 Wash. 2d 714, 734-35, 725 P.2d 422, 433 (1986).
211. According to one commentator:
Inspections have a number of important practical limitations. They are visual in nature and,
therefore, many possible defects cannot be recognized. Few, if any, tests are performed. In
addition, the inspector observes only whether or not an item or system is functioning at the
time of the inspection; no prediction is made about the future.
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ond, contracts proffered by inspectors to potential purchasers fre-
quently contain disclaimers212 and may limit inspectors' liability to the
amount of the fee for their services.2 13 It is unclear whether inspectors
treat these provisions as negotiable and whether courts will uphold
them.
- Insurance. Finally, proponents of the economic loss rule argue that
subsequent owners do not require an action against builders because it
is possible to insure them against loss. Typical "all risk" property
insurance policies, however, exclude losses resulting from defective
design or faulty workmanship in the construction of the insured prop-
erty from coverage.214 Most property owners are unacquainted with
this exclusion. Without actual knowledge, property owners will not
purchase supplemental insurance to cover defective design and faulty
workmanship.215
Homeowner's warranty policies216 present an alternative to "all
risk" insurance. Although these policies protect the subsequent pur-
chaser against latent defects better than all risk policies, they are not a
complete substitute for an action to recover economic loss arising from
construction defects. Some warranty policies provide coverage for as
Rosenthal, supra note 208, at 86.
212. Id at 87.
213. The author's experience in Wisconsin serves as the basis for this assertion.
214. See generally M. Karp, The All-Risk Policy and the Faulty Workmanship and Design
Exclusions, in The All Risk Policy: Its Problems, Perils and Practical Applications 243, 248-55
(papers presented at the March 6-9, 1986 meeting of the ABA Tort and Insurance Practice
Section). Courts mitigate the effect of the exclusion somewhat by strictly construing exceptions
against insurers. See Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California Homeowners Recover from Their
Insurer for Subsidence Damages to Their Homes?, 20 PAC. L.. 783, 788-98 (1989) (discussing a
series of California court decisions that have construed policy language "to allow recovery for
property damage where none was apparently ever intended."); M. Karp, supra at 244-48,
249-51.
215. See infra text accompanying note 227 (social engineering through liability rules is
impossible when the party bearing the risk does not know of that risk).
Builders' liability insurance policies also may not cover them against an owner's economic loss
claim caused by the builder's own negligence. Whether a policy covers a particular claim may
involve several issues beyond the scope of this Article, including the definition of "economic
loss" under the policy (which may be different than the definition used in this Article), the extent
to which another builder was responsible for the defect, and whether the structure was completed
before the defect manifested itself. See W.E. O'Neil Constr. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.,
721 F. Supp. 984, 992-96 (N.D. Ill. 1989). The argument that subsequent purchasers can insure
themselves against loss, however, applies with greater force to builders. They also presumably
can purchase coverage; they should have greater knowledge than owners of the extent of their
coverage and, therefore, are more likely to obtain adequate protection; and insurers should be
willing to provide coverage, given their provision of economic loss coverage to service providers,
such as lawyers and accountants.
216. Today, about ten percent of homeowners own such policies. See Should Your Next
Home Cany a Warranty?, 55 CONSUMER REP. 74 (1990).
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little as one year. In addition, warranties on existing houses typically
do not cover structural defects, roof problems, or termite damage;
their coverage is limited to defects in heating, water and electric sys-
tems. Moreover, the policies are expensive. One of the largest issuers
pays out less than one-third of premiums collected on repairs.2 17
These warranty policies also do not protect commercial properties.
Few subsequent purchasers, therefore, will have an adequate rem-
edy if a builder's negligence results in economic loss unless they have a
tort action against the builder. Arguably, however, no remedy is
appropriate, i.e., subsequent purchasers should bear the risk of eco-
nomic loss. That issue is explored below.
2. Economic Efficiency and Indeterminacy
The Coase theorem 21 8 provides a starting point in analyzing
whether and under what conditions builders should be liable for the
economic loss of subsequent purchasers. The Coase theorem is an
analytical proposition which, for purposes of this article, can be sum-
marized as follows:2"9 if two persons, A and B, can bargain freely for
ownership of an alienable reciprocal entitlement (E),22 ° both A and B
are profit maximizers,2 2 1 transaction costs (C) must be borne by A and
B,222 and C is less than the difference between X and Y, where X is the
value of E to A and Y is the value of E to B, then the initial assign-
ment of E does not affect the resulting allocation of resources. The
assignment has no effect because A and B will reach a bargain under
which the one who values E more will retain or acquire it, as the case
may be. That outcome will be socially efficient. If transaction costs
exceed the difference between X and Y, however, the transaction will
217. Id.
218. See supra note 16.
219. The summary below is abstracted from Hovenkamnp, Marginal Utility and the Coase
Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 783 (1990).
220. "An 'alienable reciprocal entitlement' is a transferable relationship expressed in the
common law dichotomies of 'liability/no-liability' or 'right/duty,' that exhausts all possibilities
with respect to its domain." Id. at 793. For example, assigning a builder a duty of care to a
subsequent purchaser means that she will have a claim against the builder if it fails to use the
appropriate level of care; assigning the risk to the subsequent purchaser means that she will have
none. "To say that the reciprocal entitlement is alienable means merely" that the party lacking
the entitlement may purchase it from the other. Id.
221. "This means that for any alienable reciprocal entitlement [El held by B, A will purchase
[it] at price X if [its] profitability to A [exceeds] X," but not if its "profitability to A is less than
X." Conversely, B "will sell [E] to [A] at price Y if [its] profitability... to [B] is less than Y,"
but not if its profitability to B exceeds Y. Id. No other factors but profitability enter into the
decisionmaking of A and B.
222. Transaction costs include the cost of gathering information. Id.
978
Vol. 66:937, 1991
Negligent Infliction of Economic Loss
not occur, and assignment of E to the person who values it less will
produce a socially inefficient result.22 3
Many adherents to the "law and economics" movement advocate
assignment of legal entitlements to encourage socially efficient transac-
tions, which largely entails assignment of liability so as 'to reduce
transaction costs.' 4 Aside from the normative assumption that eco-
nomic efficiency should be encouraged, devising rules on this basis
rests on the assumptions that human behavior is rational and corre-
sponds to the theorem to some extent.225
For at least four reasons, however, even though entitlements may be
assignable, people may not assign them so as to maximize profits or
utilities. First, people frequently pursue goals other than or in addi-
tion to profit maximization. 26 Second, people who do not know the
liability rules will not negotiate over rights. 227 Third, the prohibitive
cost of gathering information and engaging in negotiations may stymie
even a person who is aware of the liability rules and the possibility of
bargaining over rights.228 Finally, even if information is readily avail-
able, many are unable to make use of it because of competing demands
on their time. 2 9 It is likely that these constraints affect consumers
more than businesses.230
Notwithstanding the discrepancies between Coase Theorem analysis
and actual human behavior, fostering efficient decisionmaking and
reducing transaction costs remain desirable goals, absent counter-
vailing policy" considerations. A direct action by a subsequent pur-
chaser against a builder may provide the purchaser with the only
effective legal recourse when a purely economic loss is suffered and
may thus prevent the negligent builder from otherwise escaping liabil-
ity. If analysis showed that such an action would foster economically
inefficient results, courts would have to weigh the non-economic bene-
fits of compensating the injured party and holding the negligent party
responsible23' against the economic values to be promoted. As shown
223. IdM at 793-94.
224. See Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. Rev. 677
(1985); Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 599, 609 (1989).
225. See Latin, supra note 224, at 678; Minda, supra note 224, at 608-11.
226. See Hovenkamp, supra note 219, at 806-07.
227. Latin, supra note 224, at 686; Comment, Efficiency under Informational Asymmetry The
Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REv. 391, 405 (1990).
228. See Latin, supra note 224, at 678, 682-83.
229. Id at 683-84, 686-88.
230. See Hovenkamp, supra note 219, at 797; Latin, supra note 224, at 693-96; Comment,
supra note 227, at 405 n.48.
231. Obviously, the imposition of a negligence duty on a builder also may foster economic
efficiency by providing an incentive to act with an appropriate level of care.
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below, however, an action against a builder for negligent infliction of
economic loss operates to encourage economic efficiency, provided the
builder's liability is made reasonably determinate.
Coase theorem analysis generally has focused on only two parties.
At least three are necessarily involved, however, when a subsequent
purchaser suffers economic loss from a construction defect: the
builder, the original purchaser and the subsequent purchaser.232 This
section first analyzes the relationship between the builder and the orig-
inal purchaser; the subsequent purchaser is then brought into the
calculus under several different scenarios.2 33
Builder-Original Purchaser Relationship. Applying the Coase theo-
rem and assuming no transaction costs, whether or not a builder has a
duty of care to the original purchaser is irrelevant to determining the
degree of care the builder will use while constructing an improvement.
Suppose a builder and a landowner agree that the cost of an additional
increment of work will be $800, that if the work is not performed the
chance of economic loss increases by 10% (if the owner exercises ordi-
nary care),23 ' and that if loss occurs, it probably will be in the amount
of $10,000. Finally, suppose the parties also agree that the home-
owner will own the property indefinitely and nobody else will even use
it, eliminating all risk of economic loss to others.
Under these circumstances, it is rational for the builder to insist on
performing and charging the owner for the additional.work. Under
Judge Hand's formula, which is generally used by economists in ana-
lyzing negligence issues, the builder would be negligent if he or she did
not use extra care, because the additional probability of an accident
(10%) multiplied by the probable loss if an accident occurs ($10,000)
exceeds the cost of the action ($800).235 On the other hand, if the
expected cost is $1200, the builder should decide not to use the extra
level of care.
232. Often far more than three parties are involved. More than one builder may have
violated a duty of care, and several parties may have owned the property before the party who
suffers the loss. For simplicity's sake, this Article generally considers only three parties.
233. Professor Schwartz engaged in a similar analysis several years ago in critiquing the
California Supreme Court's decision in J'Aire Schwartz, supra note 3, at 42-50. This Article,
however, applies the analysis to disputes outside the scope of Schwartz's article and reaches
different conclusions.
234. The owner may be able to reduce the risk of loss or the amount of damages if loss occurs
by exercising an extraordinary degree of care. As a simplifying assumption, this Article ignores
that possibility in all of the following hypotheticals.
235. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (liability
depends upon whether the burden of adequate precautions is less than the product of the
probability of harm and the magnitude of the injury).
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The outcome will be the same even if the builder does not have a
legal duty to the homeowner. If the cost is $800, the homeowner will
pay the builder to do the work; if $1200, no "bribe" will be forthcom-
ig. Under either liability model, if the cost is $800, the price to the
owner will be between $800 and $1,000, with the actual price depend-
ig on the bargaining ability of each.
In reality, few builders and original purchasers will bargain over the
level of care, especially with respect to home construction. Many
homes are constructed by developers without the buyer even viewing
the structure until after it is complete. The care with which the
builder performed much of the work will be hidden. The purchaser's
primary sensitivity will be to price and to the quality of the visible
features. The builder alone will determine the level of care appropri-
ate to hidden features.
Many purchasers who contract for construction of an improvement
* are also unlikely to negotiate over the level of care. A purchaser may
not know whether the builder has a legal duty of care. Even if he
knows a builder lacks such a duty,236 the purchaser still cannot bar-
gain to impose a particular level of care unless the purchaser has suffi-
cient knowledge of building industry standards. Few home and
commercial purchasers probably possess such knowledge-or have
access to it at a reasonable cost-because of the high cost of acquiring
it through self-education or expert opinion.2 37
Original purchasers who hire both an architect and a general con-
tractor are probably in the best position to bargain over the use of
extra increments of care. Consulting both builders allows a home-
owner to acquire a second opinion on the level of care each proposes
to use. If the builders disagree, however, the original purchaser must
decide which, if either, is correct. An informed assessment may
require expensive self-education or yet another professional opinion.
Placing a duty of care on the builder should produce equally effi-
cient or more efficient decisions at lower transaction costs. Although
informed bargaining with the original purchaser over the level of care
remains unlikely,238 the builder probably knows it faces liability if neg-
236. In all states, the builder actually has a duty of care to the original purchaser. This
hypothetical highlights a reason that the builder should have that duty.
237. See Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 I. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330 (1982) ("the
subsequent purchaser is usually not knowledgeable in construction practices .... "); Note,
Builders' Liability for Latent Defects in Used Home, 32 STAN. L. REv. 607, 622 (1980) ("a
prospective home purchaser should not need to bring along a team of experts to survey the
house, its foundation, and the lot.").
238. The builder and original purchaser may negotiate, but probably over price. To the
extent that a builder continually uses less care than appropriate, it may obtain additional business
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ligent. The builder is also likely to have a strong incentive to evaluate
the costs and benefits associated with a given level of care, and to have
access to information concerning these costs and benefits, with the
exception of the original purchaser's special damages if a problem
occurs.
Although courts have not engaged in this type of microeconomic
analysis, they agree on the desirability of imposing on builders at least
a duty of care to original purchasers.2 39 Indeed, as already noted,
most states now provide additional protection to original purchasers of
houses in the form of implied warranties. 2"
Builder-Original Purchaser-Subsequent Purchaser Relationship with
Calculable, Approximately Equal Risks. Under the Coase theorem,
the existence or lack of a duty of care that runs from builders to subse-
quent purchasers does not affect the degree of care that will be used,
assuming no transaction costs and roughly equal risks for the original
purchaser and subsequent purchaser. Further assume that the original
purchaser and builder anticipate that the original purchaser will sell
the property, that the cost of the extra care is the same $800, and that
the amount of economic loss, if any, will be $10,000, even if the loss
occurs while the subsequent purchaser owns the property. They also
agree on the same 10% possibility of loss, of which three-fifths falls on
the original purchaser and two-fifths on the subsequent purchaser.
If the builder's duty runs both to the original and subsequent pur-
chasers, while the original purchaser owes no duty, in tort or contract,
to the subsequent purchaser for building defects latent at the time of
her purchase, 241 a rational builder will insist on performing the work,
for which it will charge at least $800, in order to save the $1,000 aver-
age potential liability. But if the builder's duty runs only to the origi-
nal purchaser, while the original purchaser still has no duty to the
subsequent purchaser,' a rational builder will not employ an extra
level of care: the cost would be $800, while the average savings would
in the short run, but its increased liability should more than offset any gain, eventually resulting
in the failure of its business. To the extent that a builder continually uses more care than
appropriate, its prices will probably exceed industry norms, with the same eventual result-
failure of the business. The market's slow self-corrective mechanism in weeding out builders who
price their services inappropriately, however, does not help the subsequent purchaser who paid
market value for a home constructed by an unknown builder who used below standard care.
239. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text (explaining why an original purchaser
typically will have no contractual or tort duty to a subsequent purchaser).
242. Except as assumed contractually.
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only be $600.243 The rational original purchaser, however, will pay
the builder to use the extra care. That care will save the original pur-
chaser an average of $600 directly, 2' and he will anticipate that, if the
subsequent purchaser analyzes the risks at the time of sale as the origi-
nal purchaser does when contracting with the builder, the subsequent
purchaser will pay him approximately $400 for the extra level of care.
Thus, use of the extra care will benefit the original purchaser in the
average amount of $1,000.
Now assume that the third party is a tenant to whom the original
purchaser anticipates leasing the property sometime after the building
is completed, rather than a subsequent purchaser.245 In most states,
an original purchaser has an implied warranty duty to a residential
tenant, and in a few states to a commercial tenant, to remedy defects
affecting habitability unless the tenant contractually assumes the duty
of repair.' Assume further the same cost of extra care, division of
risk between the original purchaser and tenant, and probable amount
of economic loss if any loss occurs, as in the previous hypothetical
illustrations.
Once again, whether or not the builder has a duty to the tenant does
not alter the level of care. If the builder has a duty to both the original
purchaser and the tenant, the builder should insist on performing the
work and charging at least its cost, $800. If the builder is not directly
liable to the tenant, the original purchaser will pay for the exercise of
care. He will expect to receive $600 of benefit before the lease is
assumed, and $400 of escaped liability, on average, to the tenant.2 47
243. The builder's unwillingness to adopt the socially efficient level of care should not be
surprising; analogous facts result in the "tragedy of the commons," familiar to environmental
law students. If an individual company does not pay for many of the costs of its pollution, such
as cleanup, increased health care, and loss of aesthetic and recreational values, it may decide to
discharge an extra increment of pollution when, if it paid for all those social costs, additional
discharge would be inefficient. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1244-45 (1968).
244. Because the builder's duty runs only to the original purchaser, the risk to the subsequent
purchaser cannot be included in determining whether the builder is negligent. The original
purchaser, therefore, cannot hold the builder responsible for the loss, and the extra care results in
a $600 benefit to him.
245. This hypothetical is similar to the facts in JAir, see supra notes 96-101 and
accompanying text, except that the plaintiff in that case was a tenant at the time the renovation
contract was entered. The difference in timing should not affect the analysis, except that the 60-
40 division of the risk which this Article uses in the hypothetical would be difficult to justify.
246. See R. SCHOSHnSK, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD & TENANT §§ 3:16-3:29 (1980);
Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premisew" Caveat Lessee Negligence or Strict Liability?,
1975 Wis. L. REv. 19, 91-133 (1975).
247. If the builder and original purchaser anticipate that the builder will have to indemnify
the original purchaser against any claim of the tenant, the analysis will be the same as when the
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Although this analysis may work in the ideal world of the econo-
mist, it cannot predict outcomes in the real world. Even if the original
purchaser contracts for the improvements, he is less likely to decide to
purchase extra care by what he expects to receive from, or avoid liabil-
ity to, a subsequent purchaser, than by his desire to insulate himself
from direct loss. The original purchaser cannot pay the builder to use
extra care if the improvement has been constructed prior to purchase.
Like most lawyers, the original purchaser probably will not know
whether the builder has a duty to the subsequent purchaser-knowl-
edge critical to evaluating his chance of exacting a premium from the
subsequent purchaser for the extra care. Moreover, he probably will
have little knowledge of the level of care appropriate for builders, little
incentive to bargain with the subsequent purchaser over the premium
to be paid for a given level of care, and little desire to make decisions
based on the probable actions of an unknown purchaser at an
unknown time in the future. Given these obstacles, a subsequent pur-
chaser will almost certainly not initiate any bargaining to bring about
the appropriate level of care. Making the builder liable to both pur-
chasers would thus be more likely to produce the desired level of care.
Builder-Original Purchaser-Subsequent Purchaser Relationship with
Calculable, Disproportionate Risks. Opponents of a duty from a
builder to a subsequent purchaser may object to drawing any conclu-
sions from the prior hypotheticals, believing that the efficiencies may
disappear when the original purchaser's risk is much less than the sub-
sequent purchaser's. The larger the percentage of risk attributed to
the subsequent purchaser, however, the greater the benefits associated
with a direct duty of care from the builder to the subsequent
purchaser.
Once again, given the assumptions of the Coase theorem and assum-
ing no transaction costs, whether or not the builder will be deemed to
have a duty to the subsequent purchaser will not affect the level of care
employed. To illustrate, assume that an additional level of care will
cost $800 and the risks of loss are $100 for the original purchaser and
$900 for the subsequent purchaser. The substitution of $100 for $600
and $900 for $400 in the analysis above produces identical results.
If the builder lacks a duty to the subsequent purchaser, however, the
original purchaser will be far more reluctant under the assumed $100-
$900 division of risks than under the $600-$400 division to pay the
builder to use extra care. This reluctance will stem partly from the
builder has a duty to both the original purchaser and subsequent purchaser but the original
purchaser has none to the subsequent purchaser.
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large proportion of the increased price that the original purchaser will
not recover if the subsequent purchaser perceives the risks differently.
But this reluctance may also stem in part from the reason for the dis-
proportionate risk.
The builder's exposure to the original purchaser may fall far short
of its exposure to third parties for three reasons. 48 First, a subsequent
purchaser may experience greater loss than the original purchaser
because of a different or more intensive use of the property. Such a
subsequent purchaser is more likely to pay the premium than the other
purchasers discussed below. Second, a series of purchasers may own
the property longer than the original purchaser, making it more likely
that a defect will become apparent during their ownership. The origi-
nal purchaser will find it difficult to collect the premium from the per-
son who buys from him. That subsequent purchaser will pay the full
premium only if she expects to be able to pass it on to the person who
buys from her; the same consideration will affect each owner in the
chain of title. Third, if the builder has a duty to persons without own-
ership or possessory interests in the property, such as employees of the
owner who lose wages during the period in which a defect is being
repaired, the total loss to these persons may substantially exceed the
original purchaser's.249 To the extent that persons without ownership
or leasehold interests bear the risk, the original purchaser's ability to
collect the premium virtually disappears. Simply placing a duty on
the builder to all others to whom the risks are calculable is far more
efficient.
Builder-Original Purchaser-Subsequent Purchaser Relationship with
Indeterminate Risks. The above analysis establishes that an action
exposing builders to calculable liability to persons other than the origi-
nal purchaser, even if it means substantial exposure over a long period
of time to a large class, is more efficient than a system in which the
builder's only exposure is to the original purchaser. Justice Cardozo
248. Thus far a subsequent purchaser has been treated as being a single person. In fact, a
property will often have multiple owners, and persons without an ownership, or even a
possessory, interest in an improvement may suffer economic loss from a construction defect. To
account for these possibilities "subsequent purchaser" refers in this paragraph to the individual
who purchases from the original purchaser, and "third parties" include the "subsequent
purchaser" and any others suffering economic loss.
249. These three scenarios pose the three risks identified by Justice Cardozo in Ultramares:
damages, time, and parties. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
As discussed below, however, Cardozo warned of indeterminate risks and this hypothetical
assumes that the risks are calculable. Id.
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warned, however, of liability "in an indeterminate amount for an inde-
terminate time to an indeterminate class."25
Indeterminacy is crucial. A builder, like any other person deciding
what level of care is appropriate to a task at hand, must anticipate the
conclusions of the judicial factfinder in the eventuality that harm
occurs. Assume that a builder has a duty to original and subsequent
purchasers. The builder determines that failure to use an extra level of
care will cause a 6% increase in the chance of economic loss in the
probable amount of $10,000 to the original owner, and a 4% increase
in the chance of economic loss in the same amount to the subsequent
purchaser.251 It decides against spending $1200 on extra care. An
accident causing only economic loss occurs after the original pur-
chaser has sold the property. Instead of $10,000 in economic loss,
however, the subsequent purchaser experiences a loss of $40,000.
With the wisdom of hindsight, the factfinder deems that the builder
should have anticipated a loss in this amount. The builder is held
liable. 2
If, as many courts hold, builders have a duty to act with due care to
avoid imposing economic loss on all foreseeable injured parties253 and,
if builders are liable for consequential damages,254 any risk evaluation
will be highly speculative, particularly for commercial properties. A
builder usually cannot predict how a building might be used five or ten
years in the future. Neither can the builder be expected in most cases
to foresee the impact that a given defect might have on that use, or the
various ramifications upon employees or individuals doing business
with the owner or tenant. Thus, a builder will generaly have little
basis for anticipating who may suffer economic loss, or for estimating
the amount of that loss. 255
250. 174 N.E. at 444 (emphasis added).
251. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text (analyzing similar hypothetical facts).
252. See Calfee & Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards,
70 VA. L. REV. 965, 968-69, 976 (1984) (uncertainties about courts' and juries' interpretations of
legal standards and of evidence concerning compliance with those standards will alter the
incentives for rational profit maximizers to comply with those standards). Of course, juries
probably use the Hand formula for determining negligence no more than do the builders and
original purchasers of the world.
253. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
254. See Huang v. Garner, 157 Cal. App. 3d 404, 422-26, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800, 811-12 (1984)
(dictum) (a plaintiff suffering only economic loss because of defendant's negligence may recover
lost profits and lost business opportunities); Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. v. C.F. Murphy &
Assocs., 656 S.W.2d 766, 781 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (plaintiffs may recover for the damage to their
property interests, including lost profits).
255. The builder and original purchaser may disagree about the risk of economic loss and the
probable amount of the loss which the original purchaser will experience if a defect develops
while he owns the property. The builder and original purchaser will know, however, much more
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Many builders are likely to take disproportionate precautions
against this. Recent psychological and economic studies "suggest that
people tend to regard their current or anticipated income as an impor-
tant reference point for determining the utility of income .... [T]he
utility cost of a sudden substantial reduction in income is much
greater than the utility gain of a sudden increase in income of the same
magnitude."2 6 Although some authors have suggested that this atti-
tude is limited to consumers, builders, who frequently work in small,
closely-held corporations and family businesses,257 probably manifest
the same tendencies.2"' Accordingly, they are likely to charge high
prices to protect themselves from open-ended liability. Many original
purchasers, who may enjoy only a small percentage of the benefit from
the additional measure of care used, would probably resist paying such
inflated prices. Indeterminate liability therefore threatens to impede
socially desirable construction.25 9
Even if construction occurs because the purchaser acquiesces in the
builder's expensive precautionary measures, the degree of care attend-
ing it may be unreasonable under the circumstances. Alternatively, a
builder may acquire information allowing it to adapt its level of care to
the circumstances. But information acquisition entails costs. Presum-
ably the builder has at hand, or can gather relatively easily, informa-
tion concerning the cost of additional care, the likelihood of economic
loss if additional care is not used and the probable amount of that loss
to the original purchaser. Reliable information about the impact on
unknown parties, however, will be far more expensive to obtain.
The analysis in this subsection suggests that extending the builder's
duty beyond the original purchaser fosters economic efficiency only
where the builder can identify and calculate the risks with reasonable
accuracy and at a reasonable cost. The problem of course consists in
about the risk of loss and probable amount of loss for the original purchaser than for a
subsequent purchaser whose use of the property, and even her identity, is unknown to the builder
and original purchaser at the time that they contract.
256. Hovenkamp, supra note 219, at 800; see Comment, supra note 227, at 397 ("Prospect
theory postulates loss aversion: losses loom larger than the corresponding gains. In other words,
there is less utility or pleasure in winning $100 than there is disutility or displeasure in losing
$100.").
257. Barrett, supra note 1, at 933-34.
258. See Hovenkamp, supra note 219, at 806-07 (ranchers did not engage in the type of
profit-maximizing bargaining hypothesized by the Coase theorem because they were neighbors as
much as businesspersons).
259. The analysis does not change even if the builder does not engage in formal risk-benefit
analysis. So long as the builder perceives that it must exercise care at a price hat the original
purchaser considers inappropriate in order to protect itself against liability to third parties, the
indeterminate risk may block entry into a contract.
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drawing lines in such a way that liability is not indeterminate as to
parties, period of exposure or damages. These issues are addressed in
subsection D, below.
C. Suits Between Builders
Normally an action between builders involves a claim by the general
contractor, or a subcontractor, against the project architect or engi-
neer.26 Permitting an action against the architect protects an injured
party less than permitting a subsequent purchaser to sue a builder
does; it also poses less risk of indeterminate liability. The limited ben-
efit might not justify a new action. A remedy for plaintiff builders,
however, can ride the coattails of an action for subsequent purchasers.
1. Need for Direct Action Against Architect
A subsequent purchaser generally has no viable claim when it suf-
fers only economic loss from a defect still latent at the time of
purchase, unless it can sue the builder for negligence. In contrast,
under the widely used American Institute of Architects (A.I.A.) con-
tracts,261 although the general contractor cannot directly sue the
architect for breach of contract,262 it has a claim against the owner for
260. For sake of brevity, this Article considers only claims by a contractor against an
architect or engineer, and refer only to the architect in discussing those claims. Occasionally a
builder sues a person other than the architect. See Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., 859 F.2d
242 (2d Cir. 1988) (steel subcontractors sued concrete subcontractors on a project alleging failure
to perform work so as properly to coordinate schedule); Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Nemours Found.,
606 F. Supp. 995 (D. Del. 1985) (claim by subcontractors against project owner for allegedly
providing incomplete and inaccurate plans and specifications and for various allegedly negligent
acts in supervising the construction); E.C. Goldman, Inc. v. A/R/C Assocs., 543 So. 2d 1268
(Fla. Ct. App. 1989) (claim by roofing subcontractor against consultant hired by owner to
determine whether roof was satisfactory); Hawthorne v. Kober Constr. Co., 196 Mont. 519, 640
P.2d 467 (1982) (claim by one subcontractor against another based on defendant's late delivery of
steel); Alvord & Swift v. Stewart M. Muller Constr. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 276, 385 N.E.2d 1238, 413
N.Y.S.2d 309 (1978) (claim by subcontractor against owner for interference with contractual
relations after the owner allegedly became dissatisfied with the general contractor's
performance).
261. See Note, supra note 3, at 1077; Note, The Role of Architect and Contractor in
Construction Management, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 447, 449 (1973). The National Society of
Professional Engineers and the Associated General Contractors of America have also issued
form contracts.
The basic A.I.A. forms were rewritten in 1987, Comment, Flirting with Disaster The A.I.A.
Owner-Architect Agreement Shifts the Risk of Loss to Owners, 36 Loy. L. REv. 409 (1990), and
few reported decisions construe the new provisions. Accordingly, the liability analysis below has
little caselaw support.
262. American Institute of Architects, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction,
A.I.A. Doec. A201 (1987) [hereinafter "Owner-Contractor Agreement"], which is incorporated
into all of the A.I.A. standard agreements for construction services between the owner and
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breach of contract26 3 if the plans and specifications prepared by the
architect 2 or the architect's supervision of the project265 are deficient.
Each subcontractor has the same rights against the general contrac-
tor as the general contractor has against the owner.266 If an architect's
plans or supervision result in loss, the subcontractor may bring claim
against the general contractor for breach of contract, and the general
contractor may then seek relief from the owner.
If an owner becomes liable to a general* contractor because of an
architect's deficient plans or supervision, the owner is likely to seek
relief against.the architect. The A.I.A. documents do not deal with
the architect's standard of care or an owner's right to indemnification
from the architect,267 with the result that common law principles
should prevail. Under the common law, to the extent that the owner
becomes liable to the general contractor because of the architect's neg-
ligence, the architect should be liable to the owner.268
general contractor, provides, "[t]he Contract Documents shall not be construed to create a
contractual relationship of any kind (1) between the Architect and Contractor .... " Ia § 1.1.2.
263. The claim would not be resolved in the courts. If a contractor believes that it is entitled
to an adjustment in the contract price, because of "an error or omission by the Architect" or for
any other reason, it must file a claimwhich is referred to the architect. Id § 4.3.2. If the matter
is not resolved by the architect satisfactorily to the parties, the contractor's sole recourse is to
arbitration. Ia § 4.5.
264. The owner is responsible for providing any of the architect's drawings necessary for the
contractor's work to the contractor. Id § 2.2.5. The Owner-Contractor Agreement does not
expressly permit a claim for an adjustment in contract price based on an error in the drawings,
but the general provision permitting claims based on architect errors or admissions should suffice
to permit an adjustment for a defect in the drawings. See i d § 4.3.2; see also Mayor of Columbus
v. Clark-Dietz & Assocs.-Eng'rs, 550 F. Supp. 610, 625 (N.D. Miss. 1982) (without referring to
specific contractual language, court held that general contractor may sue owner for breach of
contract to recover expenses incurred because of defects in the plans and specifications prepared
by the architect), appeal dismissed, 702 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1983). The contractor, however, must
"carefully study" the contract documents, compare them to actual field conditions, and report
any error or inconsistency to the architect Owner-Contractor Agreement, supra note 262,
§§ 3.2.1, 3.2.2. Failure to fulfill these obligations may expose the contractor to liability to the
owner or architect for work performed pursuant to the erroneous plans, id § 3.2.1; presumably,
failure to fulfill these obligations will also prevent the contractor from claiming an adjustment to
the contract price.
265. The architect has various specified supervisory powers over the work. Owner-
Contractor Agreement, supra note 262, § 4.2. In exercising these powers, the architect acts as
the owner's representative. Id § 4.2.1.
266. See American Institute of Architects, Standard Form of Agreement Between Contractor
and Subcontractor § 2.1, A.I.A. Doc. A401 (1987).
267. The only requirement is that the architect perform its services "as expeditiously as is
consistent with professional skill and care and the orderly progress of the work." Architect-
Owner Agreement, supra note 189, § 1.1.2.
268. See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 798, 802-03, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 444, 447 (1984) (when owner's liability to contractor arose only because owner provided
contractor with architect's defective plans, architect may be liable to indemnify owner even
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Unlike typical contractual provisions that operate to block recovery
by a subsequent purchaser, the A.I.A. documents, therefore, generally
provide a contractual remedy to general contractors and subcontrac-
tors. A contractor harmed by an architect's negligence also does not
confront the statute of limitations problem which plagues the subse-
quent purchaser. Presumably, the builder will know whether it has
suffered harm by the time the project is complete; it need not wait for
a defect to become manifest.269
Two gaps in the contractual protections for contractors nevertheless
may exist. First, non-A.I.A. documents may not provide for the same
contractual remedies. Second, the owner, or in the case of subcontrac-
tor loss, the general contractor, may be insolvent.
A tort action for builders, therefore, has far less importance than an
action for subsequent purchasers. Nevertheless it is not completely
superfluous: it may fill gaps in the contractual protection available to
builders. That possible role justifies examination of the efficiencies of
this potential avenue for recovery.
2. Economic Efficiency and Indeterminacy
As in actions by subsequent purchasers against builders, where
actions by builders against project architects generate economically
inefficient decisions, the cost of such actions may outweigh their bene-
fits. Many of the same considerations apply to both types of actions.
Using the Coase theorem, and assuming no transaction costs, the ini-
tial assignment of liability does not affect the level of care used. For
example, assume that an extra increment of care will cost the architect
$800. If that level of care is not used, the risk of loss to the owner is
$100; to other builders, $900. If a duty of care runs from the architect
to the owner and builders, the architect will use the extra care. If the
architect's duty runs only to the owner, the owner has a duty to the
builder and the architect need not indemnify the owner against his
liability to the builders, then the owner will pay the architect to use
the care, saving $100 on average directly and $900 on average in liabil-
ity to the builders. If the owner, like the architect, has no duty to the
builders, the owner will still pay the architect to use the care, expect-
though the contract between them was silent as to indemnification issue, because the obligation
to indemnify may arise equitably as well as contractually).
269. The A.I.A. form contracts do create a time deadline for the contractor. If something
occurs which the contractor believes justifies an increase in the contract sum, the contractor must
give written notice within 21 days after the occurrence. Owner-Contractor Agreement. supra
note 262, § 4.3.3.
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ing to recover $900 through discounted prices which the builders will
charge for their services.2 7 0
Architects, owners and contractors have different motivations in
and knowledge of the construction process. To encourage efficient
decisionmaking, liability should be assigned to the party most likely to
hold down the transaction costs associated with reaching an agree-
ment under which the architect will use a socially efficient level of
care. Assuming calculable costs and risks, the architect should be the
party bearing a duty of care. Granted, assigning an architect a duty of
care to other builders is a closer call than assigning a builder a duty of
care to subsequent purchasers, because the. difference between the
architect's and other builders' knowledge of the costs of the architect's
performance and the risks associated with a given level of care are
presumably much less than the difference in knowledge of a builder
and owner. Yet, unless an architect has no peculiar expertise, a differ-
ence must exist.
Indeterminate exposure, however, can render a builder's action
against an architect inefficient. The architect, like any other builder,
will increase its charges for services to account for its potential liabil-
ity.27 1 If the architect and other affected builders perceive the expo-
sure identically, the indeterminacy will arguably have no effect; the
architect's increase in fees to account for its liability will equal the
amount by which the various contractors will decrease their charges
because of their new potential claims. But such offsets certainly would
not occur. Studies suggest that architects would perceive their poten-
tial liability to be large, while contractors would view new opportuni-
ties to sue architects relatively pessimistically.272 Moreover, even if
builders reach approximately the same assessments internally, they
would probably use different figures in their negotiations with the
owner-with architects systematically padding their exposure and
contractors systematically deflating their benefit. As a result, the cost
of construction would likely increase.
The issue then is the extent of the uncertainties. Two of the risks
identified by Justice Cardozo in Ultramares are irrelevant. The archi-
tect should know all the types of work that the project requires by the
time it completes the plans and specifications, even if it does not know
270. See supra text accompanying notes 248-49 (analyzing builder-original purchaser-
subsequent purchaser relationship using same numbers).
271. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text. The architect is also one of the builders
who may be liable to subsequent purchasers, and will be doubly motivated to increase its charges
for services to account for its potential liability.
272. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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the identity of the contractor and subcontractors. The architect there-
fore need not worry about suits by indeterminate builders. Any con-
tractor or subcontractor should know of claims that it may have
against the architect by the time the project is complete;273 conse-
quently, the architect need not fear that a construction defect will give
rise to claims at indeterminate times.
Potential exposure, however, will be indeterminate if the architect is
liable for all the damages to other builders that its negligent plans or
supervision proximately causes.274 Certain costs, such as costs for
reconstruction work, are roughly ascertainable in advance, 275 deter-
mining costs arising from delays caused by defective plans or supervi-
sion may be more difficult, and damages arising from contractual
bonuses, obligations of the contractor to other projects, or other spe-
cial damages, 21 6 may be all but impossible for the architect to estimate
in advance.
Limiting damages recoverable by builders renders an action reason-
ably determinate, enabling architects to calculate the risks associated
with a particular level of care. The action, if so limited, will not
encourage economic inefficiencies.
D. Elements of the Action
The analysis above has identified the key elements of an action for
negligent infliction of economic loss in the construction context: such
an action should protect the injured party's reliance on the builder's
services; it should restrict the parties who can sue to a limited group of
persons whose reliance the builder could particularly foresee; and it
273. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
274. See Mayor of Columbus v. Clark-Dietz & Assocs.-Eng'rs, 550 F. Supp. 610, 627 (N.D.
Miss. 1982) (holding city and engineer jointly and severally liable to contractor for all the
damages proximately caused by its negligence), appeal denied, 702 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1983).
275. Architects' estimates, however, may not jibe with judicial determinations of the
damages. Courts sometimes use the "total cost method" of calculating damages, which consists
of "subtracting the bid on the project or the estimated cost of completion from the actual total
cost." Seattle W. Indus. v. David A. Mowat Co., 110 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 750 P.2d 245, 249 (1988).
This method may yield inflated recoveries if the initial bid was unreasonably low or factors.
unrelated to the architect's alleged negligence contributed to the contractor's cost overrun. Id.
276. Se3 Milton J. Womack, Inc. v. House of Representatives, 509 So. 2d 62, 68 (La. Ct. App.
1987) (general contractor entitled to recover from architect the $100,000 bonus for early
completion when the architect's inadequate plans prevented the contractor from completing the
project in time to earn the bonus); Seattle W. Indus. v. David A. Mowat Co., 110 Wash. 2d at 5,
750 P.2d at 248-49 (subcontractor entitled to recover from engineer on one project when
discrepancies in the engineer's drawings caused the subcontractor to do additional work on that
project, thereby causing delays and additional costs to the subcontractor on another unrelated
project). In neither case did the court state whether the architect or engineer knew or had reason
to know of the bonus or other project at the time that it performed the allegedly negligent acts.
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should limit the builder's exposure to a reasonable, defined period of
time, and the recoverable damages to those reasonably foreseeable by
the builder.
The action for negligent misrepresentation set forth in Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 552 encompasses many of these objectives.
The language of that section suggests a model for the action.
L The Builder's Duty
The first task is to define the builder's duty. The following would be
a suitable definition:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment,
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence in 'designing, planning, con-
structing or supervising the construction of an improvement (a
"builder") is subject to liability for economic loss caused to any person
identified in paragraph (2) below who justifiably relies on the due care
or timeliness with which the builder has performed its services, the
accuracy of its designs, plans or other representations, or the quality of
its work on the improvement.
(2) The liability stated in paragraph (1) is limited to loss suffered by:
(a) any person (i) whom the builder knows has or acquires
an ownership or possessory interest in the improvement prior
to or during the course of the builder's work, or (ii) if no person
satisfies clause (i), who first acquires an ownership or posses-
sory interest in the improvement after the services have been
completed;
(b) any person who has been assigned the rights of any per-
son identified in subparagraph (a) or who otherwise acquires an
ownership or possessory interest in the improvement; or
(c) any of a limited group of persons whom the builder has
particular reason to know will particularly rely on those serv-
ices, including but not limited to any other builders who are or
will be engaged in the construction of the same improvement,
even if, at the time that the builder provides those services, it
does not know the identity of any or all of those other persons,
provided that the injured party suffers the loss in connection
with the construction of that improvement.
The project of identifying a duty applicable only to builders may be
criticized as ad hoc and therefore creating undue complexity.277 There
277. See Barrett, supra note 1, at 939 (limiting recovery to fee owners of an improvement to




are several responses to this criticism. First, the common law has
developed many rules that vary depending on the particular type of
property or actors involved, such as distinct rules concerning inva-
sions of interests in chattels, land and water,2 78 that are similarly ad
hoc. Second, although the proposed action may create an additional
distinction in the law, it also eliminates one: negligent performances
and negligent misrepresentations are treated identically, at least in
claims against builders.2 79 Third, an action applying to all instances of
negligently inflicted economic loss, not just those related to construc-
tion, is formulated in Part V below. The narrower action against
builders, however, does not depend on the viability of the more com-
prehensive action;280 rather, it suggests that the more general action
also has merit.
Switching from the overall objection to the particular provisions,
paragraph (1) limits liability to one who negligently performs or mis-
represents "in the course of his business, profession or employment, or
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest." This
language, taken from the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 552(1),
shields an individual who constructs an improvement for his own use
but eventually sells it.281
Paragraph (1) differs from section 552 in one fundamental respect: it
extends the same duties to those engaged in design, planning, con-
struction and supervision of improvements, thereby treating negligent
misrepresentations and negligent performances identically.25 2 Distinc-
tions between negligent misrepresentation and negligent performance
278. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 157-66 (1965) (trespass to land), §§ 216-22
(1965) (trespass to chattels), §§ 850-57 (1979) (interference with use of watercourses and lakes).
279. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text (discussing differential treatment by
some jurisdictions of negligent misrepresentation and negligent performance claims).
280. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 38 (negligent infliction of economic loss may vary in
different types of circumstances, precluding a single solution).
281. Cf Howe v. Bishop, 446 So. 2d 11, 13 (Ala. 1984) (defendant not liable in negligence in
part because, when he acted as his own general contractor in constructing apartments, he
intended to own them indefinitely); Hopkins v. Hartman, 101 Ill. App. 3d 260, 427 N.E.2d 1337,
1339 (1981) (defendant not liable for breach of implied warranty in part because that warranty
attaches to houses built for sale in the manner of merchandise, and not to structures built for the
builder's own use).
282. Treating the two types of negligence identically does not depart from judicial decisions
as radically as from the Restatement Although some jurisdictions have followed the
Restatement's position that persons may have a duty to avoid negligent misrepresentations
causing only economic loss but not a duty to avoid negligent performances causing identical loss,
see supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text, others have imposed a duty on builders to avoid
negligent performances causing economic loss, see supra notes 92-109 and accompanying text, or
treated negligently prepared plans like any other type of negligent performance. See supra note
195 and accompanying text.
Vol. 66:937, 1991
Negligent Infliction of Economic Loss
claims are unjustified. As noted, negligent misrepresentation claims
generally can be recast as negligent performance claims, and negligent
performance claims as negligent misrepresentation claims. More
important, as this section shows, the same limitations can make both
types of claim reasonably determinate.
Finally, paragraph (1) premises liability on justifiable reliance on the
builder's services, representations or product. Not every person who
detrimentally relies on a builder, however, should have a claim; this
would create the problem of indeterminate parties.
Paragraph (2) addresses this issue by limiting the classes of potential
plaintiffs. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) give claims to persons with an
ownership or possessory interest in the improvement. The builder
should foresee that these persons may suffer economic loss when it
performs a negligent act or makes a negligent misrepresentation. Any
owner may suffer from diminution in market value or incur the cost of
repairing or replacing the defectively constructed improvement, and
any possessor may lose use of the property until repairs are completed.
Moreover, although the ownership or possessory interests may be uni-
fied at one time and carved into many pieces at another, those interests
cannot total more than the whole at any time.
A builder has no duty under subparagraphs (a) and (b) to any other
person who experiences only economic loss, no matter how severe.
The builder cannot anticipate the nature and amount of others' losses,
or the total number of persons who might suffer loss.
Although failing to arrive at a unified theoretical justification,
courts apparently have drawn similar lines between persons with and
without claims. For varying reasons they have permitted tenants to
sue builders for economic loss caused by a property defect,2"3 but have
283. See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. App. 3d 799, 805, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 411 (1979)
(sufficient nexus between contractor engaged by landlord and tenant in whose premises
contractor was performing work for contractor to be liable for negligent delay); Chubb Group of
Ins. Cos. v. C.F. Murphy & Assocs., 656 S.W.2d 766, 776-77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (distinguishes
between tenants injured by roof collapse and others who merely may have lost expected
business); A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764, 767 (1974)
(foreseeable that future tenant of commercial building would be harmed by failure to account
properly for subsoil conditions in designing building). Chubb arose out of the collapse of the roof
of the Kemper Arena in Kansas City. Plaintiffs, who alleged that they were tenants of the center,
sued the builders for their loss of use. The trial court threw out the negligence claim on a motion
to dismiss, but the appellate court reversed, stating:
Liability must be premised instead on whether the injury to plaintiffs was foreseeable and
within the policy considerations of avoiding both unlimited liability and the overburdening
of those who assume contractual responsibilities ....
The answer to that question turns on the nature of plaintiffs' injury. Defendants
characterize it as a mere loss of a business expectation at best, or alternatively, a loss of a
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uniformly rejected the economic loss claims of more remote parties,
including employees who worked at a hotel damaged by fire,284 users
of a bridge over the Mississippi River which had to be closed for seven
months for repairs," 5 and businesses which saw the tourist industry
decline after the accident at Three Mile Island.28 6
Subparagraph (c) provides for claims by members of a limited group
"whom the builder has particular reason to know will particularly
rely" on its services. Other builders on a project, who are specifically
identified as falling within the general category, may be the only per-
sons who qualify.28 7 Because the general language may be unneces-
sary in construction cases, discussion of it is deferred until Part V.2 8
The final phrase in subparagraph (c) limits the injured party's claim
to reliance on the defendant's actions or representations to the particu-
lar improvement on which the defendant acted negligently. A con-
tractor, for example, cannot sue an architect when the contractor's
attempt to use information provided by the architect on a different
project results in economic loss.
2. Damages
Merely limiting the persons to whom a builder has a duty is insuffi-
cient. If subsequent owners, tenants or other builders could sue a
builder for all economic loss caused by the builder's negligence, the
builder could not reasonably estimate its exposure. An injured party's
recovery should be limited to those damages incurred in reliance on
void oral contract. If so, extending liability would no doubt expose defendants to almost
unlimited liability to all businesses damaged in any collateral manner by the collapse of the
arena's roof ....
Plaintiffs, however, characterize their injury as a loss of rights to which they were entitled
by a lease, a recognized property interest. If that were so, their loss would not only be far
more foreseeable by defendants, who were alleged to have been aware that the arena would
be used for entertainment purposes, but extending liability would not expose defendants to
unlimited liability to all establishments which may have suffered some loss of business as a
result of the collapse of the roof.
656 S.W.2d at 776.
284. Local Joint Executive Bd., Culinary Workers Union, Local 226 v. Stem, 98 Nev. 409,
651 P.2d 637 (1982).
285. Leadfree Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 711 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1983).
286. General Public Util. v. Glass Kitchens of Lancaster, 374 Pa. Super. 203, 542 A.2d 567
(1988). The Glass Kitchens court, however, permitted plaintiffs to proceed with their claim
because they alleged that they experienced property damage and personal injury from the
radiation exposure. 542 A.2d at 571.
287. See supra note 269 and accompanying text (claim by builder against project architect
does not pose problem of indeterminate parties).
288. See infra notes 344-51 and accompanying text.
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the builder's performance or representation which were roughly calcu-
lable at the time of that performance or representation.
Contract law, supplemented by Restatement (Second) of Torts sec-
tion 552B, provides most of the necessary restrictions:
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the damages recoverable are those nec-
essary to compensate the injured party for the economic loss which he
has incurred in reliance on the builder's negligent misrepresentation or
performance with respect to an improvement, including:
(a) the cost of repair or replacement of any defect in the
improvement, unless such repair or replacement is economi-
cally wasteful, in which case the diminution in the fair market
value of the injured party's interest in that improvement;
(b) if the improvement can be repaired or replaced at rea-
sonable cost, any diminution in the fair market rental value of
that improvement during the period it is unusable or of dimin-
ished usefulness;
(c) any additional costs which the injured party incurs in
performing services which he was under contractual obligation
to perform with respect to the improvement; and
(d) any other out-of-pocket economic loss suffered incidental
to the injured party's reliance on the builder's services, includ-
ing reliance on the timely performance of those services.
(2) The damages recoverable do not include:
(a) the "benefit of the injured party's bargain," i.e., the dif-
ference between the amount which the injured party paid or
agreed to pay for an ownership or possessory interest in the
improvement and its then-fair market value, or between the
amount which the injured party received or agreed to receive
for services in connection with the improvement and the then-
fair market value of those services;
(b) any profits which the injured party expected to realize by
services to be performed in connection with the construction of
another improvement or in its business enterprise conducted at
the site of the improvement; and
(c) any opportunities to acquire interests in other properties
or to perform work in connection with the construction of
other improvements lost because of the injured party's reliance
on the builder's performance or representation.
(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (2), the injured party may recover the
benefit of its bargain, lost profits and lost opportunity costs to the extent
that the builder had reason to know of tijat bargain, expected profit, or
opportunity before committing the negligent performance or
misrepresentation.
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Under this formulation, whether a defect becomes manifest while
the original purchaser still owns and possesses an improvement, or
after it has changed hands and uses many times, will have little impact
on a builder's exposure. The identity of the owner or possessor does
not affect the diminution in market value caused by a defect, the cost
of repairing or replacing it,2 89 or any consequent loss of rental
value.2 9° The identity of the owner or possessor and the nature of the
use of the improvement will affect the amount of the bargain, profits
and opportunities lost because of the defect2 91-but those are unrecov-
erable under paragraph (2) except to the extent the builder has reason
to know of them when it commits the tort.29 2
Except when a builder has reason to know, the only damages recov-
erable by an owner or possessor of an improvement are the incidental
damages under subparagraph (1)(d). A builder can anticipate that any
owner or possessor may incur incidental damages not identified in par-
agraph (2), such as the cost of arranging for repair or for alternative
facilities during the repairs, but the amount of the damages may be
inestimable. Nevertheless, these damages, which will probably be rela-
tively minor in comparison with other damages, should be recoverable
because they represent out-of-pocket costs borne by the injured party
in reliance on the builder's actions or words.29 3
The same principle of estimability underlies the formulation of the
damages standards for actions between builders. As discussed above,
an architect or engineer can anticipate most of the additional costs
which its negligence may cause to other builders engaged on a project,
but not the profits to be realized from contract terms of which the
architect has no reason to know.294 An injured builder therefore can-
not recover those unforeseeable damages, just as a subsequent owner
cannot recover damages based on expectations which a defendant
builder has no reason to foresee. Incidental damages also are treated
the same as in actions by nonbuilders, even though the defendant may
289. Paragraph (1)(a) limits recovery to the cost of repair or replacement, or if that is
excessive, the diminution in fair market value caused by the defect. That is a normal measure of
damages for defects in improvements. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 170, § 12.13.
290. See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence. 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917,
957 (1966) (amount of direct economic loss suffered because of defective product is unaffected by
the identity of the injured party).
291. See id. at 955-56 (amount of consequential economic loss caused by defective product
may be affected by the identity of the plaintiff).
292. Foreseeability limits the recovery of consequential economic loss in the same manner as
for a breach of contract. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1987).
293. See U.C.C. §§ 2-710, 2-715(1) (1987) (a non-breaching party may recover its reasonable
incidental damages).
294. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
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have difficulty anticipating the amount-presumably relatively
smaU-of those costs.
With the exception of relatively minor incidental damages, there-
fore, this proposal eliminates the risk that imposition of liability on a
nonprivity builder will create liability in an "indeterminate amount."
It accomplishes this goal by limiting damages to those incurred in reli-
ance on the negligent actions or representations, and roughly calcula-
ble by the builder at the time of the alleged negligence.
3. Time
The final member of Cardozo's triad of risks is "indeterminate
time." This risk has taken on greater importance since his 1931 opin-
ion in Ultramares because many courts now hold that tort actions do
not accrue until the injured party discovers or reasonably should have
discovered the facts giving rise to a claim.2 9 A builder will find calcu-
lation of its ultimate exposure very difficult if the statute of limitations
on a negligence action does not begin to run until a defect becomes
manifest five, ten or more years after construction. 96 Although this
problem would plague builders to some extent even if privity remained
a requirement, extension of an action to subsequent purchasers greatly
exacerbates it.
States have adopted two means to limit the temporal risk. The first
is statutory. During the 1960s and 1970s, over forty states adopted
applicable statutes of repose which cut off claims not filed within a
specified time from the date of the allegedly wrongful action, regard-
less of the date of discovery.2 9 7 These statutes generally applied to any
295. See eg., Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run on Negligent Design
Claim Against Architects 90 A.L.R.3d 507, 521-24 (1979 & Supp. 1990) (discussing cases
applying the discovery rule to claims against architects).
296. A decision from Indiana, Essex v. Ryan, 446 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983),
highlights the problem. In 1955, a homeowner, Davis, engaged the defendant surveyor, Ryan, to
survey his lot. Id. at 369. In reliance on the erroneous survey, Davis constructed an addition,
most of which unbeknownst to Davis encroached on a neighbor's lot. Davis sold to an
intermediate party, who sold to the plaintiffs in 1962. In 1976, 21 years after the survey, the
adjoining lot owners discovered the encroachment and brought a quiet title action. The Essexes
incurred damages in excess of $10,000 in connection with the suit and its settlement, and after its
conclusion, sued Ryan. While the suit was pending, the Essexes obtained from Davis an
assignment of his rights against Ryan. Id. at 369.
The Indiana appellate court held that the Essexes had no direct negligence claim against Ryan,
not because it was time-barred, but because, even if Indiana would adopt the tort of negligent
misrepresentation, it would apply only if the parties were "in pivity... or... [the defendant]
had actual knowledge that the plaintiff would rely on the information given." Id. at 372. They
could, however, proceed with their contract claim derived from the assignment. Id. at 374-75.
Ryan, therefore, faced liability on his decades-old performance.
297. See Phillips v. ABC Builders, 611 P.2d 821, 825 (Wyo. 1980).
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claims arising from the negligent design or construction of improve-
ments to real property, and cut off claims not filed within as few as
four or as many as twenty years.298
Many courts declared the statutes unconstitutional, primarily on
equal protection grounds, because, without reasonable justification,
they granted only a narrow spectrum of defendants immunity from
suit.2 9 9 Statutes of repose, however, contribute substantially to mak-
ing builders' exposure roughly calculable. 3°  Redrafting unconstitu-
tional statutes of repose to deal with all claims of negligent infliction of
economic loss may obviate the constitutional objection. °1
Courts created the other temporal limitation. A builder is not negli-
gent, and does not breach an implied warranty, if a reasonable length
of time passes before an improvement develops a defect.30 2 The
expected efficient life of a component or treatment of the property pri-
marily determines reasonableness.30 3
These limitations-statutes of repose and reasonableness premised
on expected efficient life-together eliminate most of the indetermi-
nate time problem. Combined with the elements above, they reduce
the risks posed by an action for negligent infliction of economic loss to
an acceptable level, at least in the construction setting. With these
risks limited, the action will not be inefficient (indeed, it probably will
encourage greater efficiency) and will give legal recourse to individuals
who might otherwise have none.
298. Id. at 824.
299. Id. at 825-31 (declaring Wyoming statute of repose unconstitutional and identifying
decisions of other jurisdictions which upheld or rejected statutes of repose); Note, Actions Arising
Out of Improvements to Real Property: Special Statutes of Limitations, 57 N.D.L. REV. 43, 57-63
(1981) (jurisdictions considering statutes of repose applicable to construction-related actions
have divided almost equally on their constitutionality, with equal protection challenges being the
primary basis for overturning the statutes).
300. See Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 1175, 1206-12
(1986) (statutes of repose for claims against builders control adjudication errors caused by
passage of time and provide more definite liability rules for builders and owners, and any
reduction of rights of the injured party may be countered in part through insurance, inspections
and provisions for occupier liability).
301. See infra text accompanying note 354.
302. Compare Sheibels v. Estes Homes, 161 Ariz. 403, 778 P.2d 1299, 1301-02 (1989) (a
builder's implied warranty against termite damage does not extend beyond the five-year effective
period for soil treatment, and against floor cracks does not extend to a crack which developed ten
years after construction, when the cost of repair was only $600) with Wagner Constr. Co. v.
Noonan, 403 N.E. 2d 1144, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (a builder breaches its implied warranty
when a septic system proves defective within five years) and Moxley v. Laramie Builders, 600
P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo. 1979) (although an implied warranty expires after a house has manifested
no defect within a reasonable time, it still exists when electrical wiring proves defective within
two years after a house is constructed).
303. See Sheibels v. Estes Homes, 778 P.2d at 1302.
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Before advocating this new action, however, this Article will
address two other objections: that the proposed action will interfere
with the parties' freedom to contract, and that it will not adequately
protect injured parties.
E. Objections to the Action
1. Freedom to Contract
Opponents of noncontractual liability for economic loss argue that a
negligence action will interfere with parties' ability to contract in four
ways. First, the specter of liability will cause a builder to charge more
for services than the owner will pay, or to insist on performing work
which the owner does not want done. In either case, an otherwise
desirable improvement may not be built.3 As shown in Subsections
B and C above, however, contractual impasse should not occur so long
as the potential liability is estimable, and as demonstrated in Subsec-
tion D, the proposed action makes a builder's exposure estimable.
Opponents of noncontractual liability also assert that the possibility
of a tort action will impede parties from allocating risks and from
building inexpensive structures and will provide an unwarranted wind-
fall to parties which do not contract with the builder.3 05 I analyze
these three related arguments in the context of a suit by an owner
against a builder, but similar analysis applies to suits between builders.
The first of these arguments is correct in part. A negligence claim
may undermine the agreement between the original purchaser and a
builder if that purchaser can recover in tort but not in contract or if he
can recover more under a tort claim than under a contract claim. The
proposed tort action ordinarily will not expand the builder's liability
to the original purchaser 0 6 or permit recovery of greater damages,
however, unless the contract contains disclaimers or limitations on lia-
bility and those provisions do not apply to the tort claim. Otherwise,
the builder will be liable under either action if it acts negligently, 30 7
304. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
305. See Barrett, supra note 1, at 937-38, 941 (raising each of these arguments). All three
arguments assume that original and subsequent purchasers bargain over levels of care, which this
author doubts happens frequently. See supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text. To rebut the
arguments on their terms, however, this author must make the same assumption to some extent.
306. Indeed, if an implied warranty protects the original purchaser, he can recover for breach
of that warranty even when he cannot prove negligence. See supra text accompanying notes 116,
240.
307. Virtually every court reads into construction contracts an obligation to use the skill and
care reasonably expected of builders in that industry. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying
text (discussing the standard of care and skill read into contracts during the first half of the
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and the damages available under the proposed action will equal con-
tractual damages when the parties are in contractual privity.3 °8
To prevent circumvention of the parties' agreement, courts should
enforce provisions disclaiming or limiting tort as well as contract rem-
edies. Case law indicates that they will: their willingness to honor
clear disclaimers of implied warranties 309 suggests that they also will
enforce clear disclaimers of negligence liability for economic loss.
Similarly, if the parties agree to a term of eight months to complete an
improvement, a court should not decide that four months was reason-
able and make the builder liable in tort for taking longer.
Briefly summarized then, when parties are in privity of contract and
the plaintiff has suffered only economic loss, the contract should be the
primary source of the builder's obligations and the plaintiff's rights.
That can be assured by adherence to the following principle: when the
plaintiff and defendant are in privity of contract, the contract controls
with respect to any issue which it addresses, unless that provision is
unenforceable for any reason.
Given the primacy of the contract between the contracting parties,
the existence of a negligence action will not prevent a builder and the
original purchaser from allocating risks between them. For example,
the original purchaser may agree to limit his right to sue in return for
a reduction in price. The builder will obviously pay less for the limita-
tion because of any subsequent owner's continuing right to sue than it
will if she possesses no action.31° If the builder desires protection from
twentieth century). Negligent construction, therefore, will result in contractual as well as tort
liability.
308. Aside from the possibility of punitive damages, tort damages often exceed contractual
damages because of the ease of recovery of consequential damages. Not so with the proposed
action. Contract law provides the basis for the consequential damages provisions. See supra
notes 291-92. If the original purchaser is entitled to consequential damages under the proposed
action, he will recover them under contract law as well.
309. See Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa. Super. 11, 476 A.2d 427, 432 (1984). Cf Tusch Enters. v.
Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022, 1030-31 (1987) (a generalized disclaimer not mentioning
implied warranties is ineffective because a "disclaimer must be clear and unambiguous and such
disclaimers are strictly construed against the builder-vendor").
310. Under the UCC, a purchaser's disclaimer of, or limitation on, contractual liability also
binds any subsequent purchaser or user. U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 1 (1987). But see Patty
Precision Prods. Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 1253 (10th Cir. 1988)
(warranty limitations in contract between manufacturer and original purchaser are ineffective
against subsequent purchaser to whom the limitations were not communicated, because, with
respect to that purchaser, they were not in writing or conspicuous). By contrast, a seller cannot
disclaim strict products liability under Restatement § 402A. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1964). This Article takes an intermediate position with respect to the proposed
action. A builder may disclaim liability to the original purchaser, but that disclaimer does not
bind a subsequent purchaser.
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tort claims by subsequent purchasers, it can pay the original purchaser
to insert a limitation clause protecting the builder in any contract
which he subsequently enters to sell the property or to record a limita-
tion on the right to sue in the property's chain of title. Alternatively,
it can negotiate a similar clause directly with each subsequent owner.
The costs to the builder should differ little if at all from the costs to
purchasers absent a direct tort action. The original purchaser would
have to negotiate an agreement with the builder permitting subsequent
purchasers to sue in tort, or subsequent purchasers could obtain this
right directly from the builder.
Second, some suggest a direct tort action might prevent parties from
building a cheaper structure. The owner and architect determine the
design and budget for the structure, and these affect its quality at least
as much or more than the contractor's workmanship. The contractor,
the argument goes, should not be liable merely for following
instructions.311
This argument is fallacious in one respect, and will, if adopted,
result in certain inefficiencies. The legal system should discourage an
owner and a builder from discounting or excluding risk to subsequent
purchasers and therefore deciding to build a structure that is unrea-
sonably unsafe, when the risk to the subsequent purchaser is consid-
ered.312 Such an improvement may be cheaper in the short term but
will ultimately cost society more.
Presumably advocates of the economic loss rule are concerned
about inhibiting the construction of reasonably cheap but safe struc-
tures, that is, structures for which the cost of an increase in the level of
care would exceed the decreased risk of loss to both original and sub-
sequent purchasers. The proposed action would not interfere with the
construction of this type of improvement. Even if a builder has a tort
duty to subsequent purchasers, it will not use extra care when it
believes that the cost of the extra care would exceed the benefit. Of
course, the builder may fear that the judicial factfinder might perceive
the risks and benefits differently and impose liability even though the
builder acted reasonably.3 3 The proposed action controls against this
311. See Barrett, supra note 1, at 937-38. Some states statutorily provide that contractors are
not liable for construction defects if they perform work according to plans and specifications
provided to them, and the defect is attributable to those plans or specifications. See Comment,
supra note 256, at 414-15 n.36.
312. See supra note 243 (exclusion of subsequent purchaser from calculation of level of care
analogous to "tragedy of the commons").
313. See Barrett, supra note 1, at 937-38 (fearing that courts would impose a uniform




possibility as much as possible, and there is no evidence that courts
and juries do not recognize that different standards of care may be
appropriate for different types of structures.
Finally, the existence of the tort action is said to provide a windfall
to the subsequent purchaser. That owner may have paid less for the
improvement because of the below standard level of care. Once a
defect develops, however, she may sue the builder for damages arising
from the very same risks for which she has already obtained a dis-
counted purchase price.314
This argument once again is flawed. If a builder uses a non-negli-
gent reduced standard of care, the original purchaser should receive a
reduction in the construction price, and pass on part of it to the subse-
quent purchaser. Because the construction is not negligent, the subse-
quent purchaser has no viable claim against either the builder or the
original purchaser, and therefore does not receive a windfall. If, how-
ever, the builder reduces the level of care to a negligent level, the origi-
nal purchaser should receive a price reduction less than the total cost
savings, because the builder should demand a premium for the
enhanced tort risk. No windfall occurs: the subsequent purchaser
receives part of the original purchaser's price reduction, and the
builder covers its risks.
All three arguments fail provided two conditions are met. First, the
builder must know that an action for negligent infliction of economic
loss exists. Second, the risks must be calculable when the allegedly
negligent action takes place.
2. Adequacy of the Protection for Injured Parties
Advocates of the present implied warranty and negligence remedies
may advance another objection, namely that the proposed action does
not provide adequate relief to injured parties. This objection has sur-
face appeal. Some scholars have justified the award of expectation
damages in breach of contract and promissory estoppel cases on the
basis of the difficulty in recognizing and valuing reliance losses.31 5
The proposed action not only does not protect expectations, it does
not permit recovery for certain reliance damages, such as lost opportu-
nity costs, unless the tortfeasor had reason to foresee them before com-
mitting the tort. Hence the injured party is not completely
compensated.
314. Id. at 938.
315. See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 785-98
(1982); Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 656-59 (1982).
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In response, two points should be made. First, some compensation
is better than none. Without the limitations built into the proposed
action, the injured party should not recover at all. The absence of
limitations would make any action,' whether in contract or tort,
inefficient.
Second, the proposed action and implied warranty actions are not
mutually exclusive: implied warranty actions could be available to
whatever extent states wish to accord certain classes of plaintiffs, such
as homeowners, greater rights against builders than the proposed
action provides. Some courts already permit homeowners to sue both
for negligence and breach of implied warranty.3 16
Neither of the above objections justifies a refusal to implement the
proposed action. The proposal provides a means of relief to people
who might otherwise have no remedy, while possibly encouraging, and
certainly not inhibiting, economically efficient decisions. It should
therefore be adopted.
V. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF ECONOMIC LOSS IN
NON-CONSTRUCTION CASES
Although the action developed in Part IV applies only to construc-
tion cases, the construction cases do not appear to have unique quali-
ties. Construction cases may be divided into three broad categories:
claims by builders against other builders, which may be characterized
as claims arising from a negligently performed or communicated ser-
vice of which the injured party is a direct or indirect consumer; claims
by non-builders with an interest in an improvement against builders,
which may be called claims arising from a negligently constructed
product; and claims brought by non-builders without an interest in animprovement against its builders, which can be called "stranger"
cases.
317
Non-construction cases fall into three similar groups: claims arising
from negligently manufactured goods;318 claims arising from a negli-
gently performed or communicated service of which the injured party
is a direct or indirect customer;319 and "stranger" cases. 32 0 The simi-
316. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text. This author does not analyze the
advisability and elements of an implied warranty action in addition to the proposed tort action.
317. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text (discussing several stranger cases).
318. See infra notes 355-61 and accompanying text.
319. See infra notes 362-76 and accompanying text.
320. See infra notes 321-42 and accompanying text. The following hypothetical may clarify
the oft-blurry line between an indirect consumer of a service and a stranger. Assume that a
chemical manufacturer engages a trucking company to deliver volatile chemicals to a customer.
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larity suggests that the action proposed in Part IV, if recast into more
general terms, will apply equally well to non-construction cases.
Before reformulating the proposed tort, this Article will consider
the most recent judicial attempt to construct a generalized theory, in
People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp. 32 1 This Article will
explain why that theory is deficient, and why the proposed action is
superior. Finally, the Article will discuss the application of the pro-
posed tort, first to disputes over the quality of goods, and then to dis-
putes over the quality of services. The analysis, unlike in Part IV, is
illustrative only, not comprehensive.
A. People Express
A fire began in the freight yard of defendant Consolidated Rail Cor-
poration (Conrail) after gas escaped from a tank car punctured during
a "coupling" operation. The municipal authorities, in consultation
with Conrail, evacuated the area within a one-mile radius of the fire to
lessen the risk if the tank car exploded. The evacuation area included
a terminal of the Newark International Airport housing People
Express' business operations. Although the feared explosion never
occurred, People Express employees could not use the terminal for
twelve hours. The airline sued Conrail for negligence, seeking to
recover the amount of its fixed operating costs allocable to the period
of evacuation and lost profits. The trial court applied the economic
loss doctrine and granted summary judgment to Conrail. People
Express appealed.322
The New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to strike a compromise
by fashioning a tort of negligent infliction of economic loss. The court
reasoned that ordinary principles of foreseeability would create "hope-
lessly unpredictable" claims.32 3 A per se rule against recovery, how-
ever, would frustrate the purposes of tort law to compensate wronged
persons for their injuries and to hold liable the responsible parties. 24
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a defendant has a duty of
due care to avoid inflicting economic loss "to particular plaintiffs or
The driver operates the truck negligently, causing an accident in which the chemicals escape.
The shipee is a direct customer of the service, and any customers of the shipee who cannot
receive products in a timely manner because of the loss of chemicals necessary to their
production are indirect customers. Someone who cannot reach a destination in a timely fashion
because the road is closed by the accident is a stranger.
321. 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985).
322. 495 A.2d at 108-09. People Express also sued the manufacturer of the gas and the
owner of the tank car. Id.
323. Id. at 116.
324. Id. at 111.
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plaintiffs comprising an identifiable class with respect to whom defend-
ant knows or has reason to know are likely to suffer such damages
from its conduct." '325 An identifiable class of plaintiffs is not merely a
foreseeable class. Many members of the general public can be
expected to suffer economic loss when an accident such as the one in
People Express occurs; it is the exact nature of their injuries which will
be fortuitous and unpredictable.326 Rather, "[a]n identifiable class of
plaintiffs must be particularly foreseeable in terms of the type of per-
sons or entities comprising the class, the certainty or predictability of
their presence, the approximate numbers of those in the class, as well
as the type of economic expectations disrupted."327
In People Express the court's proximate cause and damage analysis
ran together. A defendant cannot proximately cause economic loss
that is "only generally foreseeable," but may proximately cause eco-
nomic loss that it is "in a position particularly to foresee. ' 328 It is
liable only for those damages it proximately causes, that is, those that
"are reasonably to be anticipated in view of defendant's capacity to
have foreseen . . . the risk" to the plaintiff or class of plaintiffs3 29
Those damages may include lost profits.330
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that Conrail could have fore-
seen People Express' economic loss in the event of a gas leak because
of the proximity of its offices to the freight yard, defendants' knowl-
edge of the volatility of the gas, the obvious impact of a shutdown on
the airline's operations, and the apparent existence of an emergency
response plan which called for the nearby area to be evacuated in the
event of a leak.33 1
325. Id at 116.
326. Cf supra note 320 (explaining distinction between claims by indirect customers and
strangers).
327. People Expre 495 A.2d at 116.
328. Id at 116-17.
329. Iad at 118.
330. Id
331. Id For a decision with such potentially far-reaching implications, People Express has
been cited relatively infrequently by courts of other jurisdictions. Quoting extensively from the
decision, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the People Express analysis in Mattingly v. Sheldon
Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356, 359-61 (Alaska 1987). In that case, the college's alleged
negligence resulted in physical injury to three of Mattingly's employees. The appellate court
upheld the dismissal of Mattingly's claim to recover damages for negligent interference with his
relationship with his employees, id at 361, but reversed the dismissal of his claim for negligently
caused economic loss under which he sought damages based on lost profits and increases in
expenses. Id Applying the People Express test, the court concluded that Mattingly was a
particularized foreseeable plaintiff to whom the college owed a duty of care. Id Two other
courts, however, subsequently have rejected Mattingly's extension of the People Express analysis
to employer claims arising from injuries to employees. See Edward F. Heimbrock Co. v. Marine
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Much of the New Jersey Supreme Court's analysis coincides with
the analysis in Part IV of this Article. The result, however, is diamet-
rically opposed. The court sought to avoid formulating a rule in
which the potential plaintiffs, and presumably the damages, would be
"hopelessly unpredictable and not realistically foreseeable., 332 Yet its
conclusion, permitting a "stranger" like People Express to sue, placed
an impossible burden on Conrail to assess the risks associated with its
actions. Except possibly for the impact of a shutdown on the airline's
operations, 333 the other factors mentioned by the court as causing Peo-
ple Express to fall within an identifiable class of plaintiffs-the type of
entity, the certainty of the injured party's presence, and the approxi-
mate number in the class-probably applied equally to every other
business operating within the evacuated zone, possibly numbering in
the hundreds.334 To assess the risks associated with a given level of
care, Conrail would have had to know the fixed operating costs and
profits of each. The cost of obtaining that information for each freight
yard in the country in which cars carrying hazardous substances are
coupled or uncoupled would add substantially to the cost of rail
transportation.
The People Express court's holding suggests that other "stranger"
cases have been wrongly decided. In Dundee Cement Co. v. Chemical
Laboratories3 3 5 for example, the Seventh Circuit held that the owner
of a cement plant had no claim against the driver and owner of a
tanker truck which overturned, blocking the only access to the plant
for more than five hours.33 6 Allowing recovery in such a case would
open defendants to "crushing, virtually open-ended liability. '337
Applying the New Jersey court's factors, however, the plant owner
almost certainly should have prevailed. Aside from the fortuity of the
place of the accident (the New Jersey court did not consider the fortu-
ity that the tank was punctured in the Newark freight yard instead of
elsewhere), the class of plaintiffs was presumably small, the particular
plaintiff was a business enterprise, its plant and access road had a cer-
Sales & Serv., 766 S.W.2d 70, 71-72 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989); Champion Well Serv. v. NL Indus.,
769 P.2d 382, 384-85 (Wyo. 1989).
332. People Express, 495 A.2d at 116.
333. Even that factor probably applies to most or all businesses. All would have fixed
operating costs allocable to the period of shutdown, and an unanticipated, sudden twelve-hour
shutdown would affect the profits of most businesses.
334. Businesses frequently cluster near air and rail centers.
335. 712 F.2d 1166 (7th Cir. 1983).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 1171.
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tain location, and the type of economic operations disrupted would
presumably be ascertainable in advance.3"'
Aikens v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.339 provides another illus-
tration of the problems with People Express. In Aikens the employees
of a plant damaged by a train derailment sued the railroad for lost
wages. 34 The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
on the pleadings, because the railroad had no knowledge of the con-
tracts between the plant and its employees and thus had no way to
foresee harm to the plaintiffs" interests. Permitting the claim "would
create an undue burden upon industrial freedom of action," posing "a
danger to our economic system. '341 Although in Aikens the class of
plaintiffs would have consisted of individuals instead of businesses (as
in People Express), it was predictable that the plaintiffs in Aikens
would suffer loss if the plant were forced to close; and the railroad
could have easily ascertained the number of employees and potential
lost wages in advance much more accurately than in a context like
People Express, involving lost profits and fixed operating costs.
342 If
anything, the argument for the plaintiffs in Aikens was stronger, apply-
ing the People Express formula, than it was for People Express.
These projected outcomes show that the People Express formula
undercuts the court's goal of limiting plaintiffs and damages to those
predictable and reasonably foreseeable to the alleged tortfeasor. The
formula is flawed in two fundamental, related respects. First, it does
not limit liability to those who particularly rely on the defendant's
performance or the product of that performance, nor does it limit
damages to reliance damages. Second, it does not permit reasonable
estimation of the risks before a person embarks on an action. Those
shortcomings could be eliminated with a modified approach.
B. Elements of the Action
L The Defendant's Duty
Persons have a duty to avoid the negligent infliction of economic
loss under the following conditions:
338. See supra note 327 and accompanying text (identifying factors in deciding whether a
party is within an identifiable class of plaintiffs).
339. 348 Pa. Super. 17, 501 A.2d 277 (1985).
340. 501 A.2d at 278.
341. Id at 279.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 322-31 (one of the factors in People Express for an
"identifiable class" was the type of economic expectations disrupted, which, in that case, were
lost profits and fixed operating costs).
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(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment,
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, acts
negligently or makes a negligent misrepresentation (the "defendant") is
subject to liability for economic loss caused to any person identified in
paragraph (2) below who has justifiably relied on the due care with
which that action was performed, the accuracy of that representation, or
if the action results in the generation or alteration of a tangible product,
the quality or timeliness of the work on that product.
(2) The liability stated in paragraph (1) is limited to loss suffered by:
(a) any person (i) for whose benefit the defendant takes the
action, (ii) to whom the defendant makes the representation, or
(iii) whom the defendant knows has or acquires an ownership
or possessory interest in that product;
(b) any person who is assigned or otherwise acquires the
rights of any person identified in paragraph (a) with respect to
the defendant's action or representation or the ownership or
possession of the product; or
(c) any of a limited group of persons whom the defendant
knows or has a particular reason to know will particularly rely
on either the due care with which the action has been or will be
performed or on the accuracy of the representation, or on the
quality of or timeliness of the work on that product, even if, at
the time of the defendant's actions or representations, the
defendant did not know the identity of any or all of those per-
sons, provided that the injured party suffers the loss in connec-
tion with the event or transaction for which the defendant
performed the action, made the representation or worked on
the product, or a substantially similar transaction.
Although they are expressed in more general terms, the elements of
the duty are virtually identical to those applicable only to builders.
The comments above concerning builders' duties apply equally here,
and need not be repeated.34 3 The earlier comments, however, do not
discuss the use of the word "particular" to modify "reason to know"
and "particularly" to modify "reliance" in subparagraph (c)'s descrip-
tions of the group of persons to whom a duty of care is owed, because,
as discussed above, the particularity requirements are probably unnec-
essary for the tort applicable to builders. 3"
In one sense, each person relies on others countless times every day,
such as when driving, purchasing goods at a store, or dealing with co-
employees and clients, even if that person does not know their identi-
ties or has not contemplated how their actions, if performed negli-
343. See supra notes 281-88 and accompanying text.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 287-88.
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gently, may result in harm. 45 If this type of reliance triggers liability,
the proposed tort will not limit the class of plaintiffs any more success-
fully than the People Express formula. In this sense of "reliance," the
airline company in People Express3" and the employees in Aikens 47
relied on the railroad not to act so negligently as to cause their facili-
ties to be closed. Likewise the owner of the cement plant in Dundee34
relied on motorists not to overturn their vehicles so as to block access
to the highway.
The words "particular" and "particularly" emphasize that this type
of reliance will not support liability. Instead, the injured party must
have relied on the specific defendant against whom action is brought;
the general reliance placed on any individual whose negligence might
result in harm is insufficient. Particular reliance, however, does not
necessarily require knowledge of the defendant's identity. Although
often, as in disputes between builders, the injured party knows the
identity of the person upon whom it relies, sometimes the injured
party may be relying on status. For example, a subsequent purchaser
may particularly rely on the builders of the improvements on her
property, even though she may not know their individual identities.
Moreover, the putative tortfeasor must know or have particular rea-
son to know of the injured party's particular reliance. For example, an
accountant's knowledge that potential lenders and investors frequently
rely on financial statements in making lending and investment deci-
sions is not particularized knowledge that such use will be made of the
particular statements that it prepares. To be liable to a lender or
investor, the accountant must know that the company for whom the
statements are prepared intends to use them in connection with its
efforts to obtain financing or investment of the type actually loaned or
invested. 49 Particular reason to know, however, does not necessarily
require knowledge of the intentions of another party. It may arise
from the relationship of the injured party to the alleged tortfeasor's
345. See supra notes 172-74'and accompanying text (discussing interdependence and
interreliance of members of society).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 321-34.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 339-42.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 335-38.
349. Compare RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552 illustrations 6 & 7 (1976)
(accountants who prepared audited financial statements have a duty to a lender bank when the
audited company had informed the accountants that it expected to use the statements in
connection with the negotiation of a bank loan, even though the accountants did not know the
identity of the bank) with id. illustration 10 (accountants who prepared audited financial
statements have no duty to a lender bank when the accountants had not been informed that the
audited company intended to use the statements in connection with the procurement of a loan,
even though the accountants knew that financial statements often are used for that purpose).
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activities. A builder has particular reason to know that any subse-
quent purchaser of an improvement will rely on the quality of con-
struction even though the builder does not know how long the original
purchaser intends to own the property.3
Whenever a legal standard contains broad concepts, such as both
particularity requirements, judicial decisions must elaborate the mean-
ings of those concepts. The interpretations of the particularity
requirements should limit the possible plaintiffs, in order to facilitate
efforts of a potential tortfeasor to assess the risks associated with the
particular level of care which it employs in any action. 51
Under the particular reliance and particular reason to know stan-
dards, People Express was wrongly, and Dundee and Aikens correctly,
decided. In none of the cases was liability warranted: the plaintiff did
not particularly rely on the defendant, and had plaintiff done so, the
defendant would have had no reason to know of that reliance. The
same "no duty" conclusion should prevail in most if not all disputes in
which a "stranger" has allegedly negligently caused economic loss.
2. Other Elements: Damages, Temporal Limitations, and
Precedence of Contractual Terms
The other elements analyzed with respect to the tort of negligent
infliction of economic loss by builders-damages, temporal limita-
tions, and precedence of contractual terms-need not be analyzed
again here in detail. The same considerations apply as in the prior
sections. For example, an injured party may not recover the benefit of
a lost bargain, lost profits or lost opportunity costs, unless the
tortfeasor knew or had reason to know of them before committing the
tortious act.3 52 An injured party has no negligence action to the extent
350. Arguably, the only particularity requirement should be the actor's particular knowledge
or reason to know, permitting the injured party to recover even if he only generally relied on the
actor. If the only goal is to allow an actor to estimate the risks associated with a given level of
care, the actor's particular knowledge or reason to know may suffice, even though the injured
party lacked particularized reliance. This author has rejected that position for two reasons.
First, this author doubts that this modification would make the risks roughly calculable in
practice, because it could lead to what is essentially a strict foreseeability test. Given the People
Express facts, a court could conclude that Conrail had particular reason to know that People
Express and every other business within the zone of danger was generally relying on it. Second,
existing doctrines which protect against economic loss caused by detrimental reliance, such as
promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation, require more than generalized reliance.
351. Although formulated more generally than Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 to
accommodate reliance on actions as well as representations, the proposed tort incorporates
similar standards concerning the nature and knowledge of the reliance sufficient to make a party
liable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976).
352. See supra text accompanying notes 291-92.
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that tort liability or damages would conflict with the terms of a con-
tract which the injured party entered with the defendant.353
The existence of a general tort of negligent infliction of economic
loss may provide a peripheral benefit to builders. It may permit the
drafting of statutes of repose that will pass constitutional muster in
those states which rejected earlier statutes as benefitting too narrow a
class. 54 A statute of repose applicable to all actions for negligent
infliction of economic loss should be constitutional in any state. Of
course, this will not help a builder whose alleged negligence results in
personal injury or property damage many years after completion of
construction, but will at least provide protection against economic loss
suits.
Apparently, therefore, the principles developed in Part IV can gov-
ern non-construction disputes as well. The proof, however, will come
only when the action is applied to the facts of numerous disputes.
C. Application of the Action
L Negligently Manufactured Goods
The proposed action will not help parties claiming economic loss
because of negligently manufactured goods. Adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code by the legislatures of every state except Louisiana
preempts any common law action.
The conclusion that contractual terms should control when parties
are in privity of contract is even stronger when the contract concerns
the sale of goods, because the UCC supplies terms not addressed by
the parties.355 The UCC, therefore, supplants any common law action
to recover economic loss between parties in privity of contract.
The proposed tort should have no greater role when the parties are
not in privity, for the same reason that parties suffering only economic
loss should have no negligence or product liability claim.35 6 Courts
have advanced two theories to explain why the UCC should preclude
inconsistent tort actions when allegedly defective goods cause only
economic loss: the superiority of its policy judgments, and statutory
priority over the common law. As Professor Schwartz has demon-
strated, however, the elements of a breach of warranty action under
the UCC differ little from those of a strict liability action under
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, and the differences, taken
353. See supra text accompanying note 309.
354. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
355. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-305 to 2-325 (1987).
356. See supra notes 65-89 and accompanying text.
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collectively, do not clearly favor the UCC.357 Instead, "[t]he UCC has
pertinence in the first place precisely because it has been enacted into
law by the legislatures of almost every state; and under elemental juris-
prudence, legislation takes precedence over the common law." '358
Some states have elected to abrogate the privity requirement for
implied warranty actions partly or completely.35 9 In those jurisdic-
tions, an action for negligent infliction of economic loss would provide
an alternative, and at times inconsistent, remedy. Other states have
kept the original text of the UCC, which provides that a seller's war-
ranties protect only members of the buyer's household and guests who
might reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods against personal injury. 3" To allow the tort action to operate
would frustrate any legislative decision not to extend the statutory
warranties.36' In all jurisdictions, therefore, the UCC should control.
The tort of negligent infliction of economic loss, therefore, has no
application when allegedly negligently made goods cause purely eco-
nomic harm. The UCC occupies the field. In suits not governed by a
comprehensive legislative scheme, however, such as claims of eco-
nomic loss arising from negligently performed services, courts may
apply the proposed tort.
2. Negligently Performed Services
During the last three decades, courts have increasingly concluded
that professionals, including accountants, surveyors, termite inspec-
tors, attorneys, notaries public362 and stockbrokers, 36 3 have a duty to
357. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 56-70. Because the UCC should preempt the proposed
action, comparing their relative merits is pointless.
358. Id. at 70; see Spring Motors Distrib. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660, 671
(1985) ("[C]ourts should pause before extending judicial doctrines that might dislocate the
legislative structure.").
359. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 67, § 11-3; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 59-60.
360. It provided:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the
family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person
by breach of the warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-318 (1962) (amended 1966). The section expressed no opinion whether warranties
extended to remote persons in the distribution chain. Id. comment 3. As amended, § 2-318
contains three alternative formulations, of which the original version is alternative A. Id § 2-
318 (1987).
361. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 70-71.
362. See People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107,
112-13 (1985) (identifying decisions).
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avoid the negligent infliction of economic loss upon parties with whom
they have not contracted. Two decisions imposing tort liability on
professionals demonstrate the important differences between analysis
using the proposed tort and more traditional, legal theories.
Problems sometimes arise because courts do not focus on the
injured party's reliance. In Lucas v. Hamm,3 for example, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that disappointed legatees could sue an
attorney whose improper drafting of a will frustrated the intended gift,
both in negligence and as third party beneficiaries of the contract
between the testator and the attorney.36 The allegations, however,
did not reflect that the plaintiffs relied on the gift in any way; they
alleged only that they received $75,000 less than they would have if
the attorney had drafted the documents properly.366 Without detri-
mental reliance, the intended legatees should not have had a negli-
gence claim. They did, however, have a valid claim as third-party
beneficiaries of the contract. In general, contract law should govern
the rights of disappointed legatees.367
Of course, not all claims against attorneys can be decided under
third-party beneficiary doctrine. If an attorney negligently gives erro-
neous advice, with particular reason to know that a non-client will
particularly rely on it, and that reliance causes economic loss, that
person should have a negligence claim against the attorney. The attor-
ney-client relationship should not preclude the action of a non-client
who can satisfy all the requirements of the proposed action any more
than the relationship of trust between any other type of professional,
including an architect, and its client should.3 6
A more common problem is judicial willingness to base liability on a
notion of foreseeable harm that is not appropriately circumscribed, as
courts frequently do in construction cases.369 Several decisions impos-
ing a duty on accountants demonstrate this tendency.
364. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
365. 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823-25, 364 P.2d at 687-89. The California Supreme Court
nevertheless sustained the demurrer to plaintiffs' claims entered by the trial court. When
agreeing to perform services, an attorney promises to use the skill, prudence and diligence of
lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity, but does not guarantee results. The gifts to plaintiffs
failed because they violated the rule against perpetuities. The supreme court concluded that this
provision was sufficiently complicated that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs could not show
negligence or breach of contract. 15 Cal. Rptr. at 825, 364 P.2d at 689-91.
366. 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823, 364 P.2d at 687.
367. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 42.
368. See, eg., Vanguard Prod. Inc. v. Martin, 894 F.2d 375, 378 (lOth Cir. 1990) (reversing
summary judgment for defendant attorney who knew that buyer would rely on its title opinion,
even though the seller was the attorney's client).
369. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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The leading decision, H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,370 like People
Express, comes from the New Jersey Supreme Court.37 1 In Rosen-
blum, plaintiffs, who had acquired stock in a publicly traded corpora-
tion as part of a merger transaction, sued the accountants who had
audited the corporation's financial statements for negligence and
fraud, after it was discovered that the corporation had manipulated its
books and actually was bankrupt.372  The trial court granted the
accountants' motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim,
and the plaintiffs appealed.
Although the accountants had prepared the audit report before the
merger discussions began, disputed testimony suggested that a repre-
sentative of the accountants attended those discussions and permitted
the report to be used. This fact could have made the accountants lia-
ble under the guidelines created by Justice Cardozo in Glanzer and
Ultramares,373 and certainly under the slightly more liberal rules of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 552."'
Disdaining this limited approach, the court stated that an auditor
who does not limit the recipients of an opinion "has a duty to all those
whom that auditor should reasonably foresee as recipients from the
company of the statements for its proper business purposes, provided
that the recipients rely on the statements pursuant to those business
purposes." '37 5 Without the Restatement's provision that the duty
extends only to the members of a limited group to whom the account-
ant intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient
intends to supply it, or the proposed tort's provision limiting the duty
to those whom the accountant has "particular reason to know will
particularly rely" on the information, the accountant cannot assess
with any accuracy the risks associated with a particular level of care.
Nevertheless, other jurisdictions have followed Rosenblum's open-
ended lead.376
370. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
371. One author, who believed that Rosenblum might lead many courts to adopt the principle
of "negligence liability for pure economic harm to all reasonably foreseeable parties," discussed
this decision in great detail. Dente, supra note 15, at 596-99.
372. 461 A.2d at 140-41.
373. Id. at 154.
374. Id. at 145. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text (discussing Restatement's
development out of Glanzer and Ultramares).
375. 461 A.2d at 153.
376. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 322-23 (Miss.
1987); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361, 366
(1983).
Other courts have gone in the opposite direction, imposing requirements beyond those in the
Restatement or this article. See, eg., Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 827 F.2d 155, 160-61 (7th
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These jurisdictions thus expose accountants, and other professionals
to whom the foreseeable harm standard applies, to indeterminate lia-
bility running to indeterminate parties. Use of the tort proposed in
this Article would avoid infliction of these risks and their attendant
costs on professionals and other providers of services.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has explicated the elements of a new action applicable
to all types of tortfeasors, the tort of negligent infliction of economic
loss. The new tort appears both administratively workable and equita-
ble in its operation. This Article, however, provides only the analyti-
cal foundation; further analysis is needed to reach a final conclusion
about the merits of such an action.
Regardless of the fate of the general action, courts should adopt the
proposed action for negligent infliction of economic loss by builders.
It avoids the problems associated with tort actions to recover for negli-
gently inflicted economic loss identified by Justice Cardozo sixty years
ago, and reaffirmed today through microeconomic analysis. It thus
promises to provide relief to injured parties without placing an undue
burden on builders, and intellectual coherence to an area of the law in
serious need of reformulation.
Cir. 1987) (under Indiana law, accounting firm may be liable to a lender for negligence in its
financial reports concerning the potential borrower only if, in addition to the Restatement
requirements, accountants engaged in some conduct "linking them to that [lender] which evinces
the accountant's understanding of that [lender's] reliance") (quoting Credit Alliance Corp. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 118 (1985)).
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